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References 1.  Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increasing concern with the 
performance  of public  sector institutions.  Such concern  is 
reflected, for example, in the work of the Audit Commission and 
National  Audit  Office  which  is  directed  at  improving  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of local and national government 
institutions in the context of a broader programme to reduce  the 
scale  of resources  to  be allocatedthrough  public sector decision 
making.  This  concern  with  effective  decision  making  has 
intensified debate about the potential role of the application 
of science in improved decision-aiding techniques.  This debate 
has a long history, but has gained a renewed currency with the 
development  and refinement  ofthe  power of information  technology 
(IT) with  its enhanced capacity to permit the application of 
analysis in support of decision making. 
However, there  exists a considerable degree of controversy about 
the role of scientific knowledge, analytical techniques and IT 
methods,  and  of  the experts  who  apply  them,  in  'improving1 
decision  making.  The  'rationalist1  extreme  was  perhaps 
epitomised by Yehezkel Drorls  advocacy of 'policy sciences1 in 
his concern with "...the  contribution of systematic knowledge, 
structured rationality and organized creativity to better policy 
making  ...l1  in  which  '...policy  sciences  is  essential  for 
improvement of the human condition..  .l1'  Opponents of this view 
emphasise  the  role  of  value-conditioned  judgement  and  of 
political  processes  in  particular  social  and  institutional 
contexts;  we can recall Sir Geoffrey Vickersl insight to the 
effect that 'l. .  .even the simplest of the policy maker  '  S  problems 
is not  to be  resolved by  even  the most  complicated of  his 
calculations.  .  . 
Our  research  is  located  in  this  controversial  area  and  is 
concerned with the scope for 'improving1  decision making about 
major roads investment projects through the use of computerised 
decision support  systems (DSS) based upon the framework  approach 
to scheme appraisal.  Following the  work of the Leitch Committee 
and SACTRAthe  framework  approach is now well-established as  the 
means for the applicatipn of the  cost-benefit form of evaluation 
to major road schemes.  However, in combining and comparing a 
wide  range  of  impacts,  only  some  of  which  are  readily 
quantifiable, the framework requires judgement to be exercised 
in determining relative weights and trade-offs between impacts 
and affected groups.  Our research aims to examine the  potential 
role of a decision support  system in  helping to clarify the  basis 
upon which such judgement is exercised. 
Our basic starting point in this research is the view that the 
form and application of analytical decision-aiding methods and 
techniques must  be  tailored  to  the  broader  decision-making 
process within which they are to be appliedm4 Consequently, 
there is  a need to  ensure that the development of such  techniques 
takes  place in the  context  of  an  understanding of decision-making 
practice in  the transport field, in particular its political and  - 
1 institutional dimensions.  In  OtRiordan  and Sewell's terms  what 
is  important is the  'political culturet or  "...the  modes  of 
conventions, laws, institutional guides and accustomed ways of 
doing things in the  policy-making process, namely the  mechanisms 
through  which  articulated  interests  are  translated  into 
authoritative5 action  favouring,  to  various  degrees,  such 
interests. .  . 
The aim  of this paper is to attempt to provide a contextual 
understanding of the 'realitiest  of decision-making practice in 
relation to roads decision making practice.  However, perceived 
'realitiest are  contingent upon  a  theoretical  framework for 
analysis and there is considerable  theoretical dispute about the 
nature of the state and state action which has implications for 
the study of public sector decision making.  In what follows, 
therefore,  we  provide our  analysis  of practice with atheoretical 
basis.  In Section 2 we examine briefly  the dispute between 
trationalistt  and  tincrementalistt  theories of decision making 
and develop an alternative  perspective.  Section 3 considers  the 
institutional context of transport decision making, outlining a 
theoretical framework for analysis of the influence of various 
interests  on  transport decision making.  This  framework  is 
elaborated further in Section 4 in terms of the influence on 
decision making of dominant ideological themes, of analysis and 
professionalism,  and ofthe  forms  of exercise of political  power. 
We then go on to discuss some aspects of the practice of roads 
decision  making  in  terms  of  these  influences  .  Section  5 
discusses  national  roads,  planned  and  built  by  central 
government,  while Section 6  discusses local authority roads.  In 
Section  7  we draw together conclusions  on the  nature of the roads 
decision making process and on the potential role of technical 
decision aids in this process. . . 
2.  Decision Makina in Theory 
Decisions concerning the provision of transport infrastructure 
are, primarily, the responsibility of  state  institutions at 
national or local level.  Traditionally,  it has been widely 
accepted that provision through the market mechanism would not 
result in a socially efficient outcome due to  problems relating, 
for  example,  to  externalities,  market  structure  and 
indivisibility  .6  Therefore,  decisions  concerning  the  improvement 
of  transport facilities are not made  solely on the basis of 
consumers' demand.  Rather, the central concept becomes that of 
'need' as assessed by  third parties involved in the decision- 
making process in  state  institutions,  whether appointed  officials 
(professionals  or  'experts')  or  elected  representatives 
(politicians).  However, this view of the role of the state has 
come under increasing challenge in recent years from 'New Right' 
theorists whose  ideas have  found  expression  in the Thatcher 
Government's programme of privatisation and derec~ulation.~  The 
implication of the Governments present policies is that market 
interactions  within  a  framework  of  minimal  regulation  will 
increasingly replace need as assessed by state institutions as 
the basis for decision making about the provision of transport 
facilities and services. 
The  balance between the  role of 'the  state' and 'the  market' will 
always be a controversial issue underlain by conflicting value- 
based theoretical commitments.  At the present time, however, 
public sector institutions still play a predominant role in the 
transport sector.  Within such institutions, transport  policies 
can be  seen essentially  as guidelines for the allocation of 
resources to meet defined needs; or to achieve institutional 
objectives  since  needs  are  defined  in  relation  to  such 
objectives.  Policies then become central to the effectiveness 
of  state  institutions  and  attention  focuses on the process 
whereby policies  are formulated  and decisions  concerning  resource 
allocation are made. 
Theoretical discussion of the policy-making process has been 
dominated by dispute  between, on the one  hand, those  who advocate 
the  'rational' model  (in which  decision making  involves the 
selection of the means which will maximise defined ends, the 
selection  being made on the basis of a comprehensive  analysis of 
alternatives and their consequences), and, on the other hand, 
those who  emphasise  the  'incrementalist' nature  of  decision 
making  as essentially a process of  incremental adjustment to 
perceived  problems  through  bargaining,  negotiation  and 
compromise8.  Two particular aspects of this dispute  can be 
highlighted. 
The  first  issue  concerns  the  'dual  personality'  of  policy 
analysis - the schism between, on the one hand, the concern with 
description and explanation of policy making and, on the other 
hand, the concern with prescriptive guidance on how to improve 
policy making.  These concerns tend to become confused in the 
debate.  The  rational  model  is  usually  seen  as  basically 
-  - 
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more  widely  then  government  decision  making  would  be  more 
effective9.  However, it is also widely used as a model of how 
decisions  are  made  in  practice.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
incrementalist model has been informed primarily by analysis of 
policy-making  practice,  and  therefore,  is  more 
descriptive/explanatory of the alleged  'realities*  of decision 
making in organisations.  However, the main originator of this 
model, Charles Lindblom,  has suggested that policy making should 
be incremental  because 88...complex  problems cannot be completely 
analyzed  ..."l0.  The result is an inter-weaving of empirical and 
evaluative concerns in studies of decision making. 
The  second  issue of  interest  relates to the nature  of the 
'rationality' which underpins these theoretical perspectives. 
The rational model  is founded upon procedural and  analytical 
rationality:  the  more logical procedure and analysis is applied 
to decision  making the  more effective will be the  process and the 
outcomes.  The incremental model, on the other hand, emphasises 
a political rationality:  effective decisions are arrived at 
through  an  essentially  political  process  of  bargaining, 
negotiation and compromise.  By  implication the rational model 
places more emphasis on the role of analysis and experts in the 
decision-making process while in the incremental  model the focus 
is more on the role of elected politicians. 
Attempts  have  been  made  to  derive  an  accommodation between 
rationalism  and  incrementalism  the best  known being  Herbert 
Simon's  'bounded  rationality'  or  'satisficing',  Dror8s 
'economically rational model*,  Etzioni's  'mixed scanning', and 
Linbolm's move towards 'strategic analysis'.  l'  These accounts 
are essentially concerned to combine descriptive realism from 
incrementalism  with some  prescriptive idealism from rationalism. 
They  attempt to address the main  criticisms which have been 
directed  at  each  model:  viz.  unrealism  in  the  tenets  of 
rationalism and its prescriptive implication of the domination 
of  decision  making  by  professionals;  and  conservatism  in 
incrementalist prescriptions arising through neglect of radical 
change and  emphasis  on bar%aining  and  compromise within the 
existing structure of power. 
These  developments  highlight  the  artificiality  ofthe  rationalist 
and  incrementalist models and  suggest a  *contingency  theory' 
position.  Within such an approach the focus  is on two dimensions 
of decision making  relating to the two views of rationality 
outlined above:  viz. on the one hand, analytical and procedural 
rationality  and,  on  the  other  hand,  political  power  and 
participation.  In explaining  decision-making  practice  this 
approach assesses the relative influence of factors in these two 
dimensions contingent upon the particular social,  political and 
institutional context.  It attempts to derive measures for the 
effectiveness  of decision making and to assess the contribution 
to  effectiveness  ofthe  various factors  representing 'analytical' 
and  'political'  influences.  It  derives  prescriptions  for 
'improved' policy making based upon such an analysis, in which 
possible changes in analytical techniques and procedures and in  -  .- 
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organisations, groups and  individuals will be tailored to the 
specific institutional and political context of the decision- 
making process. 
Our  examination of some  aspects  of roads  decision-making practice 
is based upon such a theoretical position.  In the next section 
we examine briefly the institutional context to elaborate the 
framework  for  a  discussion of  the  main  factors  influencing 
decision making. . . 
3.  The Institutional Framework 
The institutional context of decision making  in the transport 
sector requires analysis at trans-national, national and local 
level.  As regards the first level,  membership of the EEC brings 
with  it  a  range  of  influences  on  UK  transport  policy  and 
decision-making.  Transport  was identified by the  Treaty of Rome 
as an area for lcommon  policy1  due to its key role in achieving 
the aim  of  free movement  of  products,  people,  services and 
capital between member states.''  Limited progress has been made 
in terms of the  development of a 'positive1  policy framework  and 
the impact on national policy has derived mainly from Commission 
directives imposing various harmonization regulations  to assist 
the freer working of transport markets  (e.g.  tariffs, driver- 
hours, lorry weights and sizes).  More recently,  directives have 
been issued relative to the environmental impact of transport 
(e.g.  control  of  exhaust  emissions,  and  on  environmental 
assessment of major projects)  .  A further important influence  on 
decision-making is the availability of grant assistance from the 
EuropeanRegional  Development  Fund for  infrastructure  development 
in regions  of low  prosperity to  assist economic growth  and reduce 
regional inequalities.  The introduction of majority voting in 
the Council of Ministers and moves towards a single European 
market after  1992  have strengthenedthe  lsupranationall  dimension 
of decision-making thus generating increasing tension over tqf 
reduction of national autonomy in transport policy decisions. 
Notwithstanding  this  trend,  national  government  retains  a 
predominant role and influence in transport decision making.  In 
England this is achieved primarily  through the Department of 
Transport (DTp) which is responsible for direct provision only 
in the  case of motorways and trunk roads; its  main role is in  the 
formulation  of  policv forthe  development  of transport facilities 
and services by nationalised industries, local authorities and 
private  concerns, the control of expenditure by  nationalised 
industries  and local authorities,  and the resulation  qgf  transport 
operations in terms of both competition and safety.  By these 
means the  DTp  manages the framework for  decisions  about  transport 
provision which  is intended to achieve governmental aims and 
objectives.  Currently, these emphasise competition, efficiency 
and  support  for  economic  ,?rowth,  subject  to  safety  and 
environmental considerations. 
However,  other  government  departments  also  play an important  role 
in shaping the institutional framework for transport decision 
making.  The Treasury has significant influence by virtue of its 
central role in the allocation of  resources between spendinlq 
departments in the annual public expenditure planning process. 
The Department  of  the  Environment  plays  a  less direct role 
through its responsibilities for the system of control of local 
government expenditure, for approval of  Statutory Development 
Plans  and forthe  Urban Programme. Various interests  are  brought 
to  bear upon transport  decision  making through these  departmental 
roles.  In particular, it is possible to see a tension between, 
on the one hand, an interest in controlling the fiscal demands 
-  - 
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accumulation  (institutionalised in the Treasury)  and, on the 
other hand, an interest in securing additional resources for 
transport both to support accumulation  (cf.  promote economic 
growth) and to maintain the perceived legitimacy of, and broad 
support  for,  the  state (cf. support  public transport,  protect  the 
environment)  .  The  latter  interest  can  be  seen  as 
institutionalised in the DTp with the balance between spending 
directed at economic (accumulation) and social/  environmental 
objectives contingent upon the balance of influence of various 
political and social forces  upon the central state as brought to 
bear through, for  example, ideological  commitments,  professional 
values, interest representation in the political system and the 
process of consultation with, and lobbying of, various interest 
groups. 
18 
Therefore,  the  framework  of  policy,  control  and  regulation 
sustained by the government can be seen to shape the process of 
transport decision making  in  accordance with  the prevailing 
balance  of 'institutional  interests'.  This framework  has a  major 
influence  on  decision-making  at  the  local  government  level 
through  the  TPP/TSG  system,  through  the  system  of  local 
government financial control,  and through legislative  provisions 
relating,  for  example,  tothe  regulation and subsidising  of local 
public  transport  services.  Through  this  framework  central 
government is able to  achieve a high degree of control  over local 
authorities'  transport  expenditure  and provisionwhich,  moreover 
has  increased  significantly  over  the  past  decade.  15 
Nevertheless, local authorities retain an important degree of 
relative autonomy and discretion in relation to local transport 
policy and decisions so there is an important local dimension to 
the forms of influence of political and social forces through, 
again,  ideology,  professional  values  and  political 
representation.  In  the  next section  we elaborate  our  theoretical 
framework in  terms of the influence of these factors  on decision 
making. 4.  Ideoloqv Professionalism and Power 
'Ideology' is a controversial term often used simply to denote 
systems of ideas and beliefs about how the world does work and 
how the world ouaht to work.  However, an alternative  view links 
ideology  with legitimation  viz. 'l. .  .beliefs  and values  which are 
justifications for the status quo, the preservation of existing 
institutions  and the interests which they serve..  According 
to this view, therefore, ideology can be linked to interests 
institutionalised in the state and can be seen as playing an 
important role in  bringing such interests  to  bear upon the  public 
policy-making process. 
Cotgrove (1982)  has identified the nature of a dominant ideology 
in relation to debates on environmental issues which provides a 
set of core values upon which is constructed a set of beliefs 
about  how  society  does  and  should  work,  from  which  flow 
prescriptions for  action.  The core  values emphasise  the  creation 
of material wealth through economic growth and from these derive 
certain beliefs:  in individualism;  in the market mechanism; 
in authoritative  structures in which  elected  representatives 
managers and experts are predominant in decision-making;  and in 
the power  of  science and  technology to promote economic and 
social progress.  An important feature of this dominant ideology 
is its underlying conception of rationality in human affairs 
which is related to the belief in the objectivity of science, in 
the distinction between  'facts' and  'values';  thus, in this 
'instrumental'  view,  onlythe  discussion  of alternativemeans  can 
be rational while the consideration of ends is, by definition, 
outside the realms of rationality.  21 
Such  a  dominant  ideology  can  be  seen  as  structuring  the 
'conventional wisdom'  about  what  constitutes the  'rational' 
approach to decision making;  it provides, in Cot rove's terms, 
l'.. .the taken-for-granted common-sensical  view..  This  can  be 
seen in terms of the two dimensions of decision making which we 
identified in Section 2.  As regards the analytical/procedural 
dimension the conventional wisdom in transport decision making 
sees 'better' decisions as contingent upon the application of 
formal techniques of analysis and appraisal within a decision- 
making  process which  embodies  formal means-ends  rationality. 
This results in a major role for professionals and experts.  In 
terms  of  the political  dimension, the  authority  of  elected 
representatives in making decisions (informed  by the results of 
professional  analysis)  is  emphasised  reflecting  the  strict 
facts/value  distinction.  23  Such  authority  derives  from  the 
legitimacy of the system  of representative democracy and  is 
supported by the existence of procedures for consultation and 
'public participation' to obtain the views of the public and 
various groups on specific issues in accordance with pluralistic 
Oassumptions.  Therefore,  the  dominant  ideology structures  a  view 
of rationality which conditions conventional thought about the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the decision-making process. 
An  important  feature,  then,  of  the  approach  to  transport 
-  - 
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important  role  played  by  formal  techniques of  azalysis  and 
appraisal and by the professionals who apply them.  However, 
the  degree  of  reliance  on  such  techniques  has  attracted 
considerable criticism.  At a general level there has developed 
a critique of the 'technocratic' approach to decision making on 
the  grounds  that  its  focus  on  the  relative  efficiency  of 
alternative means in relation to given ends suppresses  political 
discussion of alternative values thus reinforcing the  'status 
quol."  More specifically, the widespread application of cost- 
benefit analysis (CBA) in transport decision making is seen by 
some  as  epitomising  technocracy  or,  in  Self's  terminology, 
'econocracyl  .26  CBA is seen as placing excessive emphasis upon 
readily-identified, direct and quantifiable impacts  of transport 
schemes  to  the neglect of impacts on the  broader environment and 
social context  which are often indirect and difficult to measure 
and quantify, which introduce consideration of a wide range of 
affected interests  and which are subject to controversy based on 
conflicting value judgements.  Therefore, it is argued that CBA 
attempts  to  reduce  issues  which  are  genuinely  social  and 
political to a purely technical level thereby eroding the scope 
for political debate and  criticism.  However, this technical 
facade  serves  to  conceal  the  actual  influence  of  powerful 
interests on the decision-making process whether such influence 
is brought  to bear  directly  through  political  processes  or 
indirectly through taken-for-gra~ted  judgements and perceptions 
applied in analytical processes. 
From this point of view, therefore, CBA performs an important 
ideological role by providing an apparently 'rational1  basis for 
transport  decision  making  (enhancing  effectiveness  and 
legitimacy)  which  conceals  and  protects  from  challenge  the 
influence of dominant partisan interests.  Moves to broaden the 
cost-benefit framework to accommodate environmental and social 
impacts, based on the recommendations of the Leitch committee in 
the late 19701s,  are seen as an attempt to accommodate criticism 
but as not changing fundamentally the basic project ''...to  make 
environmental  decisions  commensurate  with  the  market 
economy..  The  Framework  is  seen  as having  an extended 
ideological role by virtue of its incorporation of broader non- 
economic  impacts  into a  rational  assessment  calculus which, 
notwithstanding the emphasis on 'judgement1,  promotes a focus  on 
quantifiable impacts (such as noise and visual intrusion), and 
a focus on attempt@g  to quantify what has previously been seen 
as unquantifiable. 
The influence of the rational  decision-making model in  transport 
is  mirrored  by  the  role  of  professionals  in  the  transport 
planning process.  Highway engineers have traditionally had an 
important role in both local authorities and central government 
in  terms  of  perceptions  of  both  policy  and  professional 
practice.  30  Since  the  1960's  the  influence  of  professional 
economists has increased with the introduction of more rational 
methods for planning resource allocation in central government 
(as  epitomised byf for example, the recommendations  of the 1961 
Plowden Report).  These professions have readily adopted and 
-  - 
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transport  systeyp  as the  rational  basis  for more  effective 
decision  making.  Underpinned by an extensive academic research 
effort  into  extending the  sophistication and  scope of  such 
quantitative  techniques,  the  transport  experts  have  a  dual 
influence,  firstly  by  reinforcing  a  dominant  perception  of 
rationality  in  decision  making  and,  secondly,  by  applying 
judgements  and professional biases in the  decision  making process 
thus promoting particular interests.  33 
The importance of this influence is the subject of some dispute. 
On the one hand, there are those who  see, in the advent of 
technocracy, the dominance of experts over elected politicians 
in decision making -  the reduction of politics to  'rational 
administration'.  On the other hand there are those who see the 
technocratic  model and the emphasis on expertise as  a distortion 
which masks the reality of a decision-making process which is 
essentially  'political  '  in  nature  i.e.  a  process  in  which 
decisions are essentially the outcome of the exercise of power 
by  various  social  forces  through  available  channels  and 
institutions.  However, in analyzing the political dimension of 
transport decision making there is no consensus on the way in 
which such power is actually exercised.  As indicated above, the 
dominant  ideology  stresses  the  authority  of  elected 
representatives who are seen as responding to overt demands or 
pressures from various groups in a basically pluralist context. 
This view has been criticized,  however, because it neglects two 
important aspects to the exercise of power.34  The first occurs 
where there is  covert suppression  of certain demands  or  pressures 
such that they are kept off the political agenda.  The second 
occurs  where potential demands or pressures remain latent due to 
the shaping of peoples' perceptions and preferences sothat  they 
accept the status quo.  This manipulation of consensus so as to 
defuse potential  challenge to existing  dominant values Lukes 
(1974) calls  "...the  supreme and  most  insidious exercise of 
power. .  . 
The  implications  of  such  an  analysis  is  that  there  exist 
systematic  biases  in  the  ability  of  different  groups  and 
interests in society to exercise power over decision making, 
firstly in terms of resources to mobilise  overt demands and 
pressures,  secondly  in terms  of  scope  for  'inside1,  covert 
manipulation of the  political agenda, and thirdly in  terms  of  the 
extent to which interests are served by the ideological shaping 
of consensus  around dominant  values.  As regards  this  third 'face 
of power' we have referred to certain key themes of the dominant 
ideology - belief in material economic growth, in individualism 
and in the market mechanism - and it is possible to see these 
themes  at  work  in  the  formation  of  consensus  around  the 
desirability  of  private  transport  as  an  expression of  free 
individual choice in the market  and  as a means to promoting 
economic  AS regards the first two  'faces of power' 
there  has been considerable  criticism ofthe  degree of inequality 
in the ability of different groups and interests to influence 
transport policy and decision making and, in particular, of a 
perceived substantial bias in favour of the 'roads lobby'.  37  -  - 
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The  roads  lobby  represents  a  network  of  vested  interests 
including the motor  industry, road  builders and  road users. 
Organisations representing these interests (e.g.  the Society of 
Motor  Manufacturers  and  Traders,  the  British  Aggregate 
Construction  Materials  Industries,  the  Freight  Transport 
Association,  the  Automobile  Association  etc.)  operate 
individually and in association (e.g.  through the CBI Transport 
Committee and the  British Road Federation)  to  influence  transport 
policy and decision making.  Critics argue that the power and 
influence of these interests greatly  outweighs that of other 
groups (e.g.  those promoting public transport and environmental 
protection)  due  to  two  main  factors.  First,  they  have 
considerable  resources  to  expend  on  staff,  organisation, 
publicity and, most importantly, lobbying activities.  Second, 
and more significant, they have close relations with government 
via  the  Department  of  Transport  which  are  manifested  in 
consultation  and personal links.  The roads lobby is an 'insider 
group'  in the policy-making process and  is therefore able to 
exercise effective overt and covert influence in this process.  38 
From the  viewpoint of such an analysis of power, therefore,  there 
exists a  predominance of influence  overtransport  decision  making 
in  favour  of  certain  powerful  interests  promoting  private 
transport and road construction.  The scope for influence of 
alternative values and  interests is limited in various ways. 
First,  groups  and  organisations  promoting  such  values  and 
interests have fewer resources and are 'outsiders' in terms of 
relations  with government  and Whitehall.  Second,  such  values  and 
interests (relating,  for  example,  to  environmental  protection  and 
collective transport provision) do not gain direct support from 
dominant ideological themes.  Third, opportunities for direct 
participation by  the public in the decision-making process are 
circumscribed by certain  means.  The  main factor here is  the role 
of the dominant pluralist ideology which, as indicated earlier, 
stresses the authority of elected representatives responding to 
a plurality of overt group pressures and therefore the limited 
need  for  direct  participation.  This,  combined  with  the 
'authority of expertise' can be seen as leading to a culture of 
limited  participation which  implicitly  encourages  people  to 
'leave things to elected politicians and experts'.  A related 
factor  is  the  limiting  of  participation  exercises  so  that 
government objectives and policies cannot be challenged on the 
grounds that these are matters  for  'democratic decisions  of 
Parliament'.  39  Circumscribed  participation  is  implicity 
justified with reference to pluralistic themes of the dominant 
ideology. 
However, if there do exist systematic biases in the power and 
influence of different groups and  interests  in the decision 
making process then the effect of the dominant ideology is to 
conceal and legitimise such biases behind the distorted facade 
of pluralistic representative democracy.  This can be seen as 
reinforcing the legitimising role of the rational, technocratic 
model which, by identifying 'rational' decision making with the 
application  of (preferablyquantitative)  analytical andappraisal 
-  - 
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influence  of powerful groups  and interests in  the  decision-making 
process. In short, from this perspective, the dominant ideology 
serves  to  protect from scrutiny and challenge,  to  legitimise,  the 
position  and  role  of  powerful  groups  and  interests  in the 
transport policy-making process. 
This  analysis  highlights  the  importance  of  the  political 
dimension of decision-making - the importance of the form of 
exercise of power  by  various social forces to influence the 
allocation  of state-controlled  resources  in  accordancewiththeir 
interests.  Power is exercised in a variety of ways:  by overt 
and covert pressure through available institutional channels; 
by dominant ideological themes  which structure  what people 'take 
for  granted ;  by  appeal  to  the  authority  of  scientific 
techniques and expertise and of elected representatives.  This 
predominance of political power over analytical rationality is 
reflected,  moreover, in conclusions of studies of policy making 
in various fields, commonly interpreted as supporting the focus 
of the incrementalist model on pragmatic political bargaining 
processes.  40 
However, this is not to argue that the application of analytical 
and procedural rationality to decision-making is unimportant. 
There are three aspects to this dimension.  First, analytical 
techniques and procedures applied by professionals and experts 
can play an important role in increasing the legitimacy of the 
decision-making process, and of particular decisions, by giving 
an  appearance  of  rationality  that  meshes  with  dominant 
ideological themes.  Second, such techniques and  procedures 
undoubtedly do play  a role in informing the basis for choice 
where the scope for choice does exist within the parameters set 
by the political process.  Third, there remains the fundamental 
question  of  the  extent  to  which  the  effectiveness  of  the 
decision-making process could be improved by reforms which gave 
an enhanced role to 'rationalt  techniques and procedures. 
It is clear that such reforms must be considered in the context 
of the forms of exercise of political power.  Improvements in 
analytical decision aids must  be tailored  to  'key  intot  the 
political process.  Two  important questions arise:  Do  such 
improvements actually increase the quality of decisions or do 
they merely serve to enhance the appearance of rationality and 
hence the legitimacy of the decision-making process?  To what 
extent can  such improvements  enhance effectiveness in  the  absence 
of reforms to the political and institutional context - to the 
ways in which organisational,  group and individual interests  are 
represented in, and brought to bear upon, the decision-making 
process. 
We shall return to such questions in Section 7;  meanwhile we 
shall discuss some aspects of the practice of roads decision 
making to examine in more specific terms the influence of the 
various factors discussed in this section, particularly in terms 
of how they are manifested in decision making  in central and 
local state institutions.  -  - 
12 5.  Decision Makinq for National Roads 
5.1  Government Objectives and Decision Makinq 
As indicated in Section  3  above  the framework for  decision  making 
in relation to transport provision is determined and managed 
primarily  at  central government  level;  in  England  this  is 
achieved  mainly  through  the  DTp  via  policy,  control  and 
regulatory measures.  In the case of motorways and trunk roads, 
however,  the DTp is  responsible  directly for  new construction  and 
maintenance and, therefore,  the framework for  decision  making in 
this respect is provided by the Department's stated objectives 
and policies.  Two characteristics of the  Government's transport 
objectives are particularly notable. 
First, as regards general transport objectives, an emphasis is 
placed  upon  increasing the role of  the market  in transport 
provision;  thus,  heading  the  list  of  objectives  is  that 
expressing the concern to l'...  increase consumer choice, and 
efficiency, by policies to increase competition and to decrease 
the  role  of  the  public  sector,  including  deregulationt'.  41 
Second, objectives for the trunk road programme emphasise its 
role in assisting economic growth by reducing transport costs.  42 
Other objectives relate  to environmental and safety concerns  but 
the  primacy  of  assisting  economic  growth  is  clear  from 
justifications of increased expenditure on national roads since 
the early 1980's.  Thus, in the 1987 'Roads White Paper' it is 
stated that: 
'l.. .the funds allocated to the trunk road programme have 
been  substantially  increased,  largely  because  of  the 
importance attached to roads in aiding economic growth and 
increasing the com etitiveness of industry through reduced 
transport costst1.  4P 
The 1989 White Paper announced a £6 billion expansion in the 
trunk road programme44  which, again, was justified primarily in 
relation to the objective of promoting economic growth: 
"We must  maintain  the  economy's  progress.. .  .  our  main 
efforts  to  provide additional transport capacity in support 
of growth and prosperity must be directed towards  widening 
existing roads and building new ones...  The expansion of 
the programme concentrates on the need to keep Britain's 
goods moving. 
Therefore, the Government's objectives for transport provide an 
evaluative  framework  for decision making  which  reflects the 
dominant ideological themes discussed in Section 4 above - an 
emphasis upon material  growth  and  progress, upon  individual 
choice, and upon the rationality of the market.  This framework 
conditionsthe  nature  of  decisions  about  roads investment  via the 
perception  of  the  'value'  of  such  investment  -  via  the 
substantive  criteria,  and their  relative  weighting,  againstwhich 
schemes are evaluated.  However, also  of  importance is the 
-  - 
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are made.  In this respect there are two 'levels' of interest: 
first,  the  approach  to  the  determination  of  policies  and 
programmes  for national roads and, secondly, the process of 
decision making in relation to specific schemes. 
5.2  National Roads Policies and Proarammes 
The formulation  of policies for the development of the national 
road  network,  and  the  determination  of  the  programme  of 
extensions and  improvements to the network,  is primarily the 
responsibility of the DTp.  Formally, the responsibility rests 
with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament.  Policies and 
programmes are set  out in the biennial White Paper  which provides 
the opportunity for Parliamentary scrutiny and  debate.  This 
model  of  formal  representative democracy, of  constitutional 
principle, embodies the assumption of the authority of elected 
representatives  and  their decision-making  institutions which 
relates to the dominant ideological themes discussed  in the 
previous section.  It  rests fundamentally on the assumption that 
Parliament  provides and effective forum for  bringing the 'public 
interest8  to bear upon the formulation of government policy. 
We do not have the space here to review the debate around this 
issue but it is clear that the strength of one-party majority 
government and the  degree of control exercised by the Government 
over  the  proceedings  of  Parliament  seriously  undermine  the 
ability  of  Parliament  effectively  to  hold  the  executive 
accountable  to  it.46  However,  in  the  absence  of  effective 
accountability  to  the  whole  range  of  values  and  interests 
represented  in  Parliament,  there  exists  the  potential  for 
particular ideological commitments  and interests to  dominate the 
formulation  of  roads  policies  and  programmes  within  the 
executive.  The tendency for special interest lobbies to focus 
their  attention  and  efforts  on  the  executive  indicates  a 
recognition of where the balance of power lies.  47  We referred 
earlier to the degree of influence exerted by the 'roads lobby' 
primarily through relations with  the DTp  which  has been the 
subject of critical study by Hamer (1987). 
One means by which Parliament does achieve a degree of scrutiny 
over Government policy is via Select Committees, which have the 
power @'...to  examine the expenditure, administration and policy 
of the (relevant)  government  departments.. .  and associated  public 
bodies".  48  The House of Commons Transport Committee '  shadows 
the DTp and in undertaking its scrutinies takes evidence both 
from the DTp and from a range of interested organisations and 
experts.  The Transport Committee undertakes an annual scrutiny 
of the Government's expenditure plans for transport as set out 
in  the  'Public  Expenditure  White  Paper'  which  includes 
consideration of the national roads programme.  The range of 
organisations submitting evidence to the Committee tends to be 
dominated by local authority associations and the organisations 
comprising the 'roads lobby'.  As regards the consideration of 
national roads, therefore, the weight of evidence derives from 
the  latter  organisations  and  it  is  possible  to  see  the  -  .- 
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at  least  in $art,  a  reflection  of  the  influence  of  such 
organisations. 
At  the  level  of  the  determination  of  roads  policies  and 
programmes it would appear that the decision-making process is 
dominated  more  by  political  than  by  technical/analytical 
considerations.  In  addition  to the influence  of special interest 
lobbies two important aspects of the political dimension to the 
process can be identified.  The first concerns the nature of the 
transport policy framework  in  which decisions  on  the  scale  of  the 
trunk road programme are made independently of considerations 
relating to other modes.  This reflects the ideological and 
political commitment to market principles and a  Isupply-side1 
orientation  to  the  policy process deriving from the  belief in the 
sanctity of free consumer  choice in a competitive  market.  Within 
such a framework the notion of integrated planning of transport 
provision across all modes on the basis of  'need1  is ruled out; 
decisions on the road programme become a matter of responding to 
consumer  choice in  the form of actual and forecast  traffic levels 
subject  to a particular pricing regime.  In  this  way the  broader 
approach  to thinking  about  the  issue of  roads provision  is 
conditioned by political and ideological parameters and it can 
be seen as producing an inherent momentum towards increasing  the 
supply of road capacity due to the perception: 
"It would...  be wrong -  and  economical1  damaging -  to 
deprive people and businesses of choice."  5Y 
The second important aspect of the political dimension of the 
decision-making process relates to the allocation of resources 
to  the  trunk  road  programme  during  the  public  expenditure 
planning  process.  Notwithstanding  attempts  to  render  this 
process more  'rational' through the introduction of Programme 
Planning and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) and Programme  Analysis and 
Review (PAR),  and the establishment of the Central Policy Review 
Staff (CPRS) during the 1970's  (attempts  which met with little 
success) decision  making on the allocation of public expenditure 
has remained a predominantly political process.  In  the  words of 
Sir Douglas Wass: 
I1It  is,  however, when it comes to dividing the agreed total 
between  the  different  programmes  that  the  concept  of 
rationality begins to come under strain.  Decisions in this 
area  are  governed  by  two  well-entrenched,  if  rather 
arbitrary principles.  Number  one:  'as things are, so 
broadly  they remain1;  and  number two:  'he who has the 
muscle gets the money l'.  51 
Therefore,  although the  DTp  may support  its  negotiations  with the 
Treasury with extensive analysis and appraisal  l'..  .at the end 
there is a political judgement to be made which in practice is 
necessarily  determined  as  much  by  constraints  as  by 
priorities.  'ls2 
The predominantly political nature of the process of decision 
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renders the latter subject to the dominant  influence of the 
particular  values  and  interests which  are  promoted  by  the 
Government and which are brought to bear by  powerful pressure 
groups upon the institutions involved in the process.  In the 
present context of one-party majority government the ability of 
Parliament in practice to scrutinise  critically these  values and 
interests  and  to  bring  alternatives  to  bear  upon  policy 
formulation is extremely limited.  However, issues of policy and 
strategy  are  excluded  from  consideration  in  the  process  of 
decisionmaking on specific  road schemes  precisely on  the  grounds 
that these  matters have been subject to  the Idemocratic  decision 
of Parliament8.  In this way the Government8s  policies can be 
seen as legitimised, further protected from critical scrutiny, 
with reference to the ideology of the democratic authority of 
elected representatives and of Parliamentary institutions. 
5.3  The Plannina of S~ecific  Schemes 
Therefore, the  process of decision  making on specific  trunk road 
schemes  is  heavily circumscribed by prior decisions  which are  not 
open to question when individual schemes are considered.  The 
main stages in the  planning process for specific  major trunk  road 
schemes are indication in Figure  Broadly, the process has 
four main phases.  In the first phase an existing problem and 
need  for  a  road  scheme  will  be  identified  and  preliminary 
traffic, economic and  environmental assessments undertaken  in 
Scheme  Identification  Studies  to  determine  whether  traffic 
management measures, road widening or a new route represents  the 
best  solution.  The Secretary of State makes the decision on 
whether a major  scheme  (>Clmill) is needed  and,  if  so, this 
enters the White Paper Programme. 
In the second phase more detailed assessment of the traffic, 
economic and environmental effects of alternative scheme  designs 
are undertaken,  informal confidential discussions are pursued 
with local authorities and statutory undertakers, and the views 
of the Landscape Advisory Committee are obtained.  A number of 
scheme  options  are  then  presented  in  a  public  consultation 
exercise via a local exhibition.  The Secretary of State then 
makes a decision on a preferred route on the  basis of analytical 
results and the views expressed at public consultation. 
During  the  third  phase,  more  detailed  surveys  and  traffic, 
economic and environmental appraisals are undertaken as a basis 
for  detailed  design  of  the  preferred  option.  Further 
consultations take place with  local authorities and  statutory 
undertakers and draft statutory orders are published under the 
terms of the 1980 Highways Act.  If objections to these orders 
are received from affected parties which cannot be resolved by 
negotiation  a  Public  Inquiry must  be  held  into  the  orders. 
Inquiries are conducted by  an independent Inspector, nominated 
by the Lord Chancellor, who hears the DTp8s  case for the scheme 
as proposed, the cases presented by  objectors and,  commonly, 
representations from local authorities, other interested groups 
and residents.  The  Inspector  reports  tothe  Secretaries of State  -  - 
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Source:  Dept of Transport  (1986) for Transport and for the Environment, making recommendations, 
and the Secretaries of State then decide jointly whether the 
scheme should go ahead and on any amendments to the statutory 
orders. 
The fourth and final phase of the process involves acquisition 
of the necessary land, the letting of contracts by competitive 
tender,  the construction of the road and its subsequent opening 
to traffic.  The length of the whole process depends upon the 
size  and  complexity  of  the  scheme  and  upon  the  extent  of 
opposition from local groups and individuals;  recent experience 
indicates an average period of some 14 years. 
54 
It is evident that this planning process is characterised by a 
relatively high degree of centralisation  of decision  making.  All 
the major decisions - on whether a major scheme is needed and 
therefore should be included in the programme, on the preferred 
route and on whether, and  in what form, the scheme should go 
ahead - are  made by the 'Secretary  of State' (i.e. at  high levels 
in the DTp).  Only relatively minor decisions on scheme design 
etc. are delegated to lower levels. 
Once again, this is justified in terms of the accountability of 
Minsters to Parliament but in reality this provides very little 
opportunity  for decisions to be challenged  on the basis  of 
alternative  values and priorities.  Once a scheme is  incorporated 
into the White Paper programme there is a presumption that a 
major new road will be built subject to its being agpraised as 
economically viable and environmentally acceptable.  However, 
it is not clear that the analysis which provides the basis for 
such  incorporation  is  commonly  of  any  more  than  a  fairly 
preliminary  nature;  moreover,  there  would  appear  to  be 
relatively little opportunity for affected qroups and interests 
to influence decision making at this stage.  The Government  'S 
policy is generally to employ firms of consultants to undertake 
the  Scheme  Identification  Studies  and informal  consultations  with 
local  authorities  apparently  are  undertaken  at  this  stage. 
Nevertheless,  the Standing Advisory  Committee  on Trunk Road 
Assessment  (SACTRA) have criticised the inadequacy of public 
consultation  prior to the inclusion of a scheme in the  programme 
and have recommended a greater role for local authorities in the 
development of trunk road proposals  due tothe  greater lopemess' 
of their decision-making processes to local communities. 
The Government has  not  been  very  receptive to proposals to 
increase the role of  local  authorities.  58  This  is possibly 
because of the greater scope it would provide for influence of 
alternative  values and interests in decision making on national 
roads, enhancing the potential for controversy over issues of 
need and policy and undermining the current rationale of the 
decision-making  process  which servesto  protect Government  policy 
from  challenge.  Thus, the  process  followed  in relation to 
specific schemes effectively restricts debate to consideration 
of the relative merits of alternative route options for a given 
scheme in terms of their  purely local impacts.  It focuses  debate 
on the question  'what is the best form of this road scheme?'  -  .-  - rather  than  'what  is  the  best  approach  to  addressing-  this 
transport problem?' 
Opportunities  for local communities  to  partici~ate  in the  process 
are extremely limited.  The public consultation exercise (which 
is not mandatory) presents people with various options for a 
given scheme.  "This is  probably the first time  %Fat many members 
of the public will hear about the proposals".  The terms of 
reference for such consultation are to obtain views on the form 
of the scheme and not on whether the scheme is necessary since 
the latter  has been the subject of prior decision.  At the Public 
Inquiry stage  objectors can challenge the need for a scheme only 
on  restricted  technical grounds;  they  cannot  challenge the 
Government's  policy  commitment  to  road-based  solutions  to 
transport  problems since  this  has  been subject to  the 'democratic 
decision of Parliament'. 60 
Duringthe  1970's there  developed considerable  frustration  on  the 
part of certain interest groups with the decision making process 
for trunk roads.  There were two main reasons for this.  The 
first was this heavy circumscription of terms for consultation 
and participation in relation  to  specific schemes  which excluded 
'matters of policy'  from debate and challenge.  The second was 
the  DTp's  use  of  techniques  for  analysis,  forecasting  and 
appraisal in planning specific schemes which were perceived as 
producing biases in favour of roads investment.  In particular, 
traffic forecasting  methods were criticised as tending to over- 
estimate future traffic and the cost-benefit analysis approach 
to  evaluation  was  criticised  as  placing  undue  emphasis  on 
quantifiable economic criteria to the neglect of less tangible 
environmental and social impacts, many of which would count as 
'disbenefits'.  61  This  frustration  resulted  in  widespread 
objections  to  road  schemes  at  public  if:?quiries and  in  the 
disruption and delay of certain inquiries. 
There are two possible interpretations  of the underlying causes 
of such frustration and opposition.  On the one hand, it can be 
seen as a result of a failure of procedures employed in decision 
making adequately to  take into account the full range of impacts 
of road schemes and how these impacts affect different groups, 
and to permit these groups to represent their interests in the 
process  whereby  decisions  are made  about  trade-offs  between 
impacts.  On the other hand, it  can be seen as a result of a 
fundamental conflict of values, with opponents of road schemes 
rejecting the dominant  ideology, perceived as structuring the 
decision-making process, and challenging the structure  of power, 
perceived  as supported by  a process  which  preserves  central 
control over decisions and  limits the scope for influence of 
alternative interests. 
The Government's  response to these problems in the late 1970's 
indicatedthat it adoptedthe  first of the  above interpretations. 
Thus,  in  1976  the Government  announced  a  review  of  highway 
inquiry procedures "...to  see what could be done to improve the 
presentation and  intelligibility of  the  information which  is 
provided  to objectors and  to make the arrangements generally  - 
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Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment was set  up,  with Sir 
George Leitch as Chairman, to review the methods used by the DTp 
for analysis  and appraisal of trunk road schemes.  Of particular 
concern were methods of traffic forecasting and the relative 
weight given  to  economic and environmental factors  in  evaluation. 
The Government's main concern in setting up these reviews, was 
to speed up the planning process and, in particular, to avoid 
delays due to opposition  from  local  interest groups.  The 
results were recommendations for procedural and methodological 
reforms intended to promote more discussion and information for 
such groups and thereby restore  their confidence in  the fairness 
of  the decision-making process.  Thus, the highway inquiries 
review recommended the nomination of the Inspector by the Lord 
Chancellor, opportunities for objectors to question the DTp on 
traffic  forecasts and  design standards, improved pre-inquiry 
procedures to resolve objections where possible on the basis of 
fact,  and  the  provision  of  better  information  for  inquiry 
participants.  65  These proposals were  related closely to the 
introduction of the annual Roads Policy White Paper which, we 
have seen,  was perceived as  providing for Parliamentary approval 
of policy and the justification for the restrictio~  of the scope 
of public enquiries in relation to policy issues. 
In its concern to 'improve' the decision-making process and to 
reduce the potential for conflict over road schemes, the Leitch 
Committee focused on two main issues.  The first was the concern 
to improve internal management control: 
"It  is  in  the public  interest that  there  should  be  a 
standard  procedure  through  which control  can  be  exercised... 
we believe a standard evaluation procedure to be a very 
valuable  management  tool  which  allows  relatively minor 
decisions to be  decentralised whilst  preserving  central 
control.  l'67 
The  second  issue  concerned  the  improvement  of  public 
understanding  of,  and confidence  in,  the  decision-making  process; 
thus, it was argued that: 
l'..  .the  assessment  should  be generally comprehensible  to  the 
public and should commend their respect...  so long as a 
significant number of informed people believe that current 
practice does not adequately consider their and society's 
intereststhenpublic  inquirieswill  be  acrimonious,  lengthy 
and expensive.  'la 
Therefore, the concern of the Leitch Committee was to improve 
procedures both for 'internal' planning and management control 
within the DTp and for 'external8  management of the  way in which 
local  interests  are  brought  to  bear  upon  decisions.  The 
'Frameworkr  approach to scheme appraisal was proposed as the 
basic  means to improved effectiveness  in  decision  making in  terms 
of the two attributes:  'control8  and 'consent'.  The Framework 
represents an extension of the cost-benefit  analysis  approach  to  - scheme  evaluation  to  take  account  of  broader  non-economic 
('environmental1 and  lsocial') impacts some of which are not 
quantifiable.  The essence of the Framework is to set out in 
tabular  form  all  the  relevant  impacts  of  scheme  options, 
indicating how  they  would  affect  different groups,  so that 
decision  makers  can  "...trade  off  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  for each alternative...  and...  reach a decision on 
which one should be built.  Therefore, the Framework permits 
a measure of the overall 'valuea  of a scheme to be derived  (as 
a mix of quantitative and qualitative attributes) which was seen 
by  the Leitch Committee as providing the basis for determining 
rational merit ratings and relative priorities in the programme 
according to a consistent calculus,  and, in this  way, permitting 
more effective management of the programme.  In addition, the 
Framework would help strengthen  central control  by ensuring that 
minor decisions taken at lower leve&s  in the DTp hierarchy are 
consistent with higher level goals. 
As regards the 'external management of consent', the Framework 
was seen as providing a generally comprehensible  approach,  which 
could  command  public  respect, for  identifying  how  different 
groups  would  be  affected  by  road  schemes.  Used  in  public 
consultation on  scheme options  and  at public  inquiries,  it 
provides an approach  to  managingthe influence  of local interests 
in the decision  making process which, if it gains the confidence 
of  the  groups  involved,  serves  to  enhance  the  perceived 
legitimacy of the process.  In this way the process can proceed 
more  quickly  and  effectively  -  affected  groups  will  have 
confidence  that their interests are being taken into account and 
will be more prepared to accept the trade-offs inherent in the 
diverse scheme impacts. 
5.4  Framework ADDraisal in Scheme Planninq 
These procedural and methodological reforms  proposed in the late 
1970's  have  been  incorporated  into the trunk  road  planning 
process under the banner of the dual objectives of 'efficiency' 
and  Ifairness'.  These  two  objectives  relate  to  the  two 
dimensions of decision making discussed in Section 2 above viz. 
analytical  and  procedural  rationality  on  the  one  hand  and 
political  power  and  participation  on  the other.  These two 
dimensions are reflected in Leitch's perspective on the  value of 
the Framework approach: 
"...it  can  provide  an  intelligible means  of  presenting 
comprehensive information to the public, and can help them 
to identify how the different groups will be affected.  It 
can also provide a basis for designers and decision makers 
to  reach  rational judgements  on schemes,  takin  into  account 
the full range of benefits and disbenefits."  4 
This perspective can be seen as underpinned by two fundamental 
assumptions.  The first is that embodied in the rational model 
of decision making discussed in Section 2 above viz.  the more 
logical procedure and analysis is applied to  decision making the  - 
20 more  rational will  be  the process  and  outcomes.  Better 
decisions are seen as contingent upon the application of formal 
techniques of analysis and  appraisal to clarify the relative 
merits of alternative  means in relation to  given ends.  The ends 
concerned  (objectives/values) are given to decision making on 
specific schemes by terms of reference which exclude government 
policy and objectives from scrutiny on the  grounds that  these  are 
matters  for  democratic  decision  of  Parliament.  Public 
participation and consultation  is  restrictedto  issues  concerning 
the  local  distribution of  gains  and  losses with  a view  to 
obtaining 'fairness' in this distribution;  broader dimensions 
of distributional issues are, again, set by Government policy, 
determined by prior decision which are not open to question in 
the consideration of specific schemes.  Fairness in the local 
distribution  of  costs and  benefits  can  be  obtained  through 
procedures  which provide  affected  parties  with better information 
and promote discussion,  negotiation and compromise.  This  brings 
us to the second underlying assumption of pluralist consensus - 
that political power is exercised on the basis of a fundamental 
value consensus in society and that all groups' interests can be 
accommodatedthroughtheinstitutions  of representative  democracy 
supplemented  where  appropriate  by  direct  participatory 
procedures. 
These assumptions are consistent with the dominant ideological 
themes discussed in Section 4 above.  In effect the procedural 
and methodological reforms introduced in the  trunk road planning 
process can be seen as responding to criticism by refining and 
extending  procedures  in  accordance  with  these  prevailing 
ideological themes.  Thus, in the Framework approach, a wider 
range of  scheme impacts has been  brought  into the ambit  of 
'rational technique',  incorporated into the technocratic  (or 
'econocratic')  logic of  cost-benefit analysis which, critics 
argue, promotes efforts to quantify the unquantifiable and to 
impose  market  exchange  values  on  environmental  and  social 
qualities.  The scope of influence of professionals and experts 
is thereby extended through renewed efforts at quantification in 
the name of consistency and rationality and through their role 
in applying the Framework in the decision-making process.  A 
basis for  management of public consultation and participation is 
provided  to give local groups greater confidence that their 
interests are being accommodated.  Finally, a basis is  provided 
for  more effective management of the trunk road planning process 
within the  DTp to ensure  that local decisions  are consistent  with 
the parameters of central control. 
However, in terms of the contribution of the Framework approach 
to improving the rationality and effectiveness of the trunk road 
decision-making  process,  two  reservations  arise  from  this 
critique.  First, the primary use of the Framework is to aid the 
process of choice between route options for a given scheme;  it 
is used after a decision has been made that a scheme should be 
included in the programme.  We argued earlier that this latter 
decision produces a heavy presumption in favour of a major new 
road of some form but such decisions are based upon only fairly 
preliminary analyses.  Indeed, decision making at this level is 
-  - 
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extent  to  which  political considerations  are important.  It  would 
appear that the Framework approach is not widely used as a basis 
for establishing a broad  definition of  'value for money'  of 
schemes  and for  establishing priorities so  as  to  promote the  most 
effective  use  of  resources.  "  In  practice,  therefore,  the 
Framework  would  appear  to  have  a  limited  impact  on  the 
Irationality* of the decision-making process in the broadest 
sense.  The scope of its contribution to rationality is mainly 
focused on the consideration  ofthe  local impacts of alternative 
route  alignments  for  a  given  scheme,  in  particular,  the 
distribution  of gains  and losses  between different  groups,  within 
a context  shaped  by prior decisions  which reflect  the ideological 
themes,  values and interests  promoted by the  Government and which 
are *given1  to decision making at scheme level. 
The second reservation about the contribution of the Framework 
to  'rational' decision making  follows from the first.  This 
contribution rests in large part upon its ability to promote 
acceptance by different  groups  of the balance of  gains  and losses 
produced by a scheme.  However, if controversy over road schemes 
is due, to any significant degree, to conflict over fundamental 
ideological,  value commitments,  then the scope for agreement and 
consensus on the  basis of the 'rational*  analysis and discussion 
of the distribution of local scheme impacts will be limited.  In 
this event, opposition to road schemes  will not simply be based 
upon the perception of adverse  local impacts  but will derive from 
the  rejection of the  dominant ideological  themes  and  values which 
are perceived as underpinning the Government's objectives and 
policies  and  structuring  the  decision-making  process.  The 
latter,  however, are  not open to discussion and challenge in the 
consideration of  specific  schemes producing  a  situation  of 
frustration  and  unresolved  conflict  in  which  a  decision  to 
proceed  with  a  scheme  simply  over-rides  the views  of  some 
opponents. 
Therefore, to the extent that controversy over major trunk road 
schemes is about fundamental values, and to the extent that the 
dominant values expressed in government objectives and policies 
remain,  in  practice,  insulated  from  effective  scrutiny  and 
challenge  by opposing groups, then conflict over road schemes  is 
likely to persist in spite of the attempts of the Framework 
approach to  increase 'rationality'  and in spite  ofthe  procedural 
reforms to highway  inquiries  to increase  'fairness*.  Such 
methodological  and  procedural  reforms  do  not  address  the 
fundamental  issues of  the  influence of  dominant  ideological 
themes, values  and  interests on  decision making  and  of  the 
broader structure  of the  decision-making process which preserves 
central  control  and limits  the scope for  influence of alternative 
values and interests. 
The Framework approach can be seen, then, as performing a dual 
role in relation  to  both the *rationalityn  and *legitimation1  of 
the trunk road planning process.  As regards rationality there 
are two aspects.  On the one hand,  it  seeks to provide  an 
enhanced measure of the 'value' of a road scheme  by extending the  - framework of cost-benefit analysis to accommodate environniental 
as well as economic impacts.  On the other hand, it  seeks to 
identify  how this  wider range  of impacts  affects  different groups 
and  to  promote  discussion  and  acceptance  of  a  particular 
distribution of gains and losses.  As regards legitimation, the 
Framework seeks to persuade groups and individuals affected by 
a road scheme  that their  interests  and, indeed, a  broader 'public 
interest', are taken fully into account through the introduction 
of this more 'rational1  approach to decision making on specific 
schemes.  It  can  be  argued  that,  by  focusing  on  improved 
rationality  and  fairness  at  the  level  of  consideration  of 
specific  scheme  options,  the  Framework  approach  serves  to 
legitimise the broader decision-making process, concealing the 
influence of dominant ideological themes, values and interests 
in the  wider process behind a 'rationalistic1  facade.  It thereby 
promotes widespread acceptance of decisions which, in reality, 
reflect these influences by giving the appearance that they are 
outcomes from a rational procedure. 6.  Decision Makina for Local Roads 
6.1  Central Government Control over Local Decision Makinq 
The  planning  and  provision  of  non-trunk  roads  is  the 
responsibility of local authorities subject to a framework of 
policy  and  control  maintained  by  central  government.  The 
responsible  authorities  are  county  councils  in  the  non- 
metropolitan  areas,  district  councils  in  the  provincial 
conurbations,  and borough councils in London.  This  has beenthe 
situation  since  1986  when  the  GLC  and  metropolitan  county 
councils,  which  had  responsibilities  for  conurbation-wide 
transport planning, were abolished. 
The  main stages in the  planning process for  major local  authority 
roads are illustrated in Figure 2.  73  Four main phases can be 
identified  corresponding broadly  to  those  described  in  the 
previous section relating to trunk road schemes.  The first 
phase involves  the  identification  of a problem and the  assessment 
that a road scheme is needed to address the problem.  The impetus 
may be from local communities,  elected members or professionals; 
schemes may arise out of transportation studies undertaken by 
authorities, possibly  commissioned from external consultants. 
Broad  scheme proposals at this stage will  be  based  on some 
combination of technical appraisal and political impetus;  the 
situation will vary between authorities as will the emphasis on 
public consultation.  Broad proposals  will eventually be included 
in draft statutory development plans which are subject to an 
Examination in Public before approval by the Secretary of State 
for the Environment. 
In the second phase of the process alternative specific designs 
for the scheme are evaluated and public consultations  undertaken 
as a basis for deciding on the specific form and cost of the 
scheme.  Again, the approach to technical appraisal and public 
consultation and  the degree of  political  input from elected 
members varies considerably between authorities.  There are no 
standard appraisal procedures for local authorities  although, as 
we  shall see later, the Government has  an  influence on the 
process  via  arrangements for financing road  schemes.  Local 
communities  have an additional statutory basis for influence at 
this stage since major scheme details must be included in Local 
Plans which are subject to consultation and a possible public 
inquiry.  In the third phase, following detailed scheme design, 
authorities  must publish a planning application and the  necessary 
statutory orders which may  be subject to a public  inquiry if 
objectors cannot be satisfied through negotiation.  In  the light 
of the Inspector's recommendations  the Secretaries of State for 
the Environment and for  Transport  decide jointly  whether to  grant 
permission and confirm the orders. 
Once a scheme has been thus approved, an authority will include 
it in its  Roads Capital Programme  which must be submitted to  the 
DTp  in  the  annual  'Transport Policies and  Programme'  (TPP) 
submission to seek capital spending approval and, if elegible, 
-  - 
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Source  :  Dept of Transport  (1986) Transport Supplementary  Grant (this  is discussed further  below). 
When spending approval is received the authority can proceed the 
construction of the scheme. 
Decision making  by  local authorities within  this process  is 
subject  to  a  significant  degree  of  influence  by  central 
government via a 'control framework' which comprises three main 
dimensions.  First, the functions, responsibilities and powers 
of local government are laid down in legislation as approved by 
Parliament and all decisions and actions by  local authorities 
which have resource implications  must receive sanction  from this 
legislation (i.e. must be 'intra  vires').  In our system of one- 
party  majority government, the government in power can enact 
legislation to define with considerable precision the scope of 
local authorities1 activities, the procedures which they must 
follow in making decisions on resource allocation, and the way 
in which resources can be raised to finance their sanctioned 
activities.  The  main  legislative  provision  covering  the 
functions of local government in England and Wales is the Local 
Government Act of 1972 but the present Government has enacted a 
substantial body of legislation over the past decade which has 
affected the  responsibilities,  procedures and financing  of local 
government, reflecting a concern to achieve a greater degree of 
central control over local authorities and their policy-making 
activities.  "  The  responsibilities  of  local  authorities  in 
relation to the provision, improvement and maintenance of roads 
are covered mainly  by  the 1980 Highways Act  but  legislation 
affecting  the  financing  of  roads  expenditure  is  also  of 
considerable importance to local decision making on roads; we 
consider this further below. 
The second dimension of central control operates at the level of 
local  authorities'  policies  which,  in certain respects,  must gain 
the approval of central government.  Thus, authorities' policies 
for the development and use of land, including the development 
of the road system, must be set out in statutory development 
plans  (Structure Plans and  Local  Plans  in  county  areas  and 
Unitary Development Plans in London and the metropolitan areas). 
These plans must receive the approval of the Secretary of State 
for  the  Environment.  The transport  policies  thus  approved 
provide the policy framework for authorities' annual 'Transport 
Policies and Programmes' (TPP) submissions to the Secretary of 
State  for  Transport, which  are  required  to  demonstrate  how 
authorities1  proposed expenditure  programmes for  roads  relate  to 
the  approved  policies.  The  Government  scrutinises  such 
programmes and sanctions capital spending power to cover their 
implementation to the extent that they are consistent with the 
Government's transport and public expenditure  policies.  Through 
control  over  the  allocation  of  capital  spending  power  the 
Government  maintains an important degree of influence over local 
authorities1 decisions on road  programmes;  we  discuss this 
further below.  Influence is also achieved  at the level of 
policies and programmes through advice notes and circulars;  in 
particular,  the  annual  circular  relating  to  authorities' 
preparation  of  TPPs  provides  guidance  on  the  Government's 
requirements  and  preferences  in  relation  to  various  policy  -  - 
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The third dimension of central government control is financial. 
Central control over local Government finance is embodied  in 
legislation and the  Government  has enacted a substantial  body of 
such legislation over the past  decade to change the control 
systems and to attempt to achieve a greater degree of control 
over local authorities1  expenditure and the way in which it is 
finan~ed.~' Capital expenditure on improvements to local roads 
is financed mainly through borrowing with debt repayments made 
from current expenditure financed from local rate revenue and 
Rate Support Grant (RSG) from central government.  The level of 
RSG payments is subject  to strict control and the Government has 
powers  to  limit  individual  authoritiesf  rate  increases. 
Authorities can finance some capital expenditure from capital 
receipts according to rules laid down by central government and 
their total capital expenditure on all services is subject to 
control through capital allocations.  The  capital allocation for 
transport  capital expenditure  is  decided by the  Government  on  the 
basis of TPP submissions;  however, authorities are free to vire 
allocation between  services within the total notified by  the 
Government.  The system of expenditure control will change in 
April  1990 when the  'community charge1 will replace domestic 
rates and the focus of capital expenditure control will revert 
to borrowing through 'credit approvals'.  76 
More  specific  influence  and  control  is  achieved  by  central 
Government  over local authorities1  roads  policies and programmes 
through  arrangements  for  payment  of  Transport Supplementary  Grant 
(TSG) to support the construction and improvement of roads 'of 
more than local importance1 i.e.  local authority roads which 
carry significant proportions of longer distance traffic.  It is 
the Government's  policy  that the construction of  such roads 
should  be promoted to  complement  he development  of the  trunk  road 
system in order to achieve  the Government's objectives for roads 
discussed in the section  5.1  above.  Since 1985/86 the  Government 
has restricted TSG to support for capital expenditure (at  a rate 
of 50%) on such roads  and authorities  must compete for  grant from 
a cash-limited sum on the basis of submissions in their TPPs 
which  must  provide  justifications  of  proposed  TSG-eligible 
expenditure  and  detailed  appraisals  (economic,  safety  and 
environmental) for 'major schemes' costing £1 million or more. 
TSG paid  in respect of such major schemes is hypothecated and 
closely monitored and scrutinised by  the DTP;  authorities may 
also receive a  'block TSG1 for minor  schemes of less the £1 
million.  Capital allocations  are  given for  expenditure  supported 
by  TSG;  the remaining, non-TSG element of authoritiesf  roads 
programmes is  unlikely to  be covered fully by capital allocation 
because  of assumptions made by  the Government concerning the 
availability  to  authorities  of  spending  power  from  capital 
receipts. 
The Government is able to maintain a high degree of influence 
over local authorities' roads programmes via arrangements for 
TSG.  Grant  support  is  now  directed  at  encouraging  local 
authorities to build and improve roads which play a significant 
-  - 
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which authorities might not normally give high priority given 
their primary concern to meet the local needs of their areas. 
Through TSG, therefore, the Government is able to influence the 
priorities  of  local  authorities  to be  consistent  with  the 
Government's own objectives and policies which, as  we have seen, 
stress in particular, the promotion of economic growth through 
reduced costs for industrial and commercial traffic and relief 
for communities of the environmental effects of such traffic. 
Arrangements for monitoring major TSG-supported schemes ensure 
that authorities keep to agreed programmes. 
The degree of this influence is illustrated by roads  expenditure 
trends in recent years.  Whilst stating a wish to promote local 
roads  expenditure  the  Government  has  restricted  capital 
allocations  over the past three years or so on the grounds that, 
in aggregate, local  authorities have  substantial accumulated 
spending power  from  capital  receipts which  they  can use to 
support  roads  expenditure.  In  practice,  however,  many 
authorities have not been able to conform to this assumption 
either because they are not able to generate receipts on the 
scale  assumed or because other services (e.g.  housing, education, 
social services) take priority  for  those receipts which  are 
available.  This has meant that their roads expenditure has had 
to  be constrained; thus, in 1987/88 total budgeted roads  capital 
expenditure by  local authorities in England was some 24% below 
the Government's planned level.  However, this constraint has 
affected mainly non-TSG expenditure i.e.  that directed by local 
authorities  at  purely local  needs; TSG-supported expenditure  has 
been sustained and,  consequently,  comprises  a growing proportion 
of total local roads allocation.  In a recent study of a sample 
of local authorities the increase in this proportisn between 
1986/87 and 1987/88 was found to be from 72% to 83%. 
It is clear, therefore, that central  Government  is able to 
exercise considerable  influence over local authorities1  decision 
making in relation  to  roads  via the  framework of legislation,  via 
requirements for scrutiny and  approval  of policies, and  via 
arrangements  for  controlling  the  financing  of  local  roads 
programmes.  More generally,  through  this 'control framework1  the 
Government attempts  to ensure that decision making by  local 
authroities produces  outcomes which  are  consistent with  the 
Government's own transport objectives,  policies and priorities, 
and, therefore, with the dominant ideological commitments and 
interests promoted thereby. 
6.2  The Growth of Central Control 
This control framework can be seen as managing the 'balance of 
power1 between  central and  local government, determining the 
scope for local discretion within centrally-defined parameters. 
Indeed,  a tension  between central control and local autonomy can 
be  seen  as inherent  in  our  political  system  with  its  long 
tradition of strong local government with considerable spending 
and  tax-raising powers but  subject to controls exercised by 
central government via  Parliament.  However, the appropriate  -  - 
2  7 'balance of power' between centre and localities  will always be 
a matter of contention and this balance is open to change by 
central government subject  to its ability to  gain support  for  and 
enact Parliamentary legislation.  The  present  government  has  been 
able to affect a significant shift in this balance in favour of 
central  government  due  to its large  majority in Parliament.  This 
has enhance the ability of central government  to  ensure that the 
policies and programmes of local authorities are  more consistent 
with the Governmentls  objectives and priorities. 
Indeed, one of  the main  factors underlying  the Government's 
preoccupation overthe  past decade  with achieving  greater  control 
over local government spending,  which has resulted in this shift 
in the balance of power, has been a conflict at the level of 
ideology  and  values  between  the  Government  and  some  local 
authorities.  This  conflict  was focussed primarily on the  GLC and 
metropolitan county councils (MCCs) which, following the local 
elections  in  May  1981,  came  under  the  control  of  labour 
administrations which  developed policies  and  priorities very 
different from those of the Government.  This resulted in large 
increases in the level of spending by these authorities  at a time 
when the  Government  was seeking to reduce  public expenditure  and, 
more  specifically,  large  increases  in  spending  on  public 
transport  at atime  when  the  Government's policies and priorities 
emphasised more road building.  The Government failed to resolve 
this conflict through changes in expenditure control mechanisms 
and eventually enacted legislation to abolish these authorities 
in the form of the 1985 Local Government Act.  This supports the 
argument in the previous section indicating the importance of 
values  and  ideological  commitments in  conflicts over policy 
issues  and the inadequacy of measures addressing the 'technical' 
dimensions of such conflicts to resolve them.  1 
Through legislation to abolish  the  GLC and MCCs and to deregulate 
local bus transport (in the 1985 Transport Act),  the Government 
has succeeded in achieving a substantial change in the pattern 
of local authorities1  transport expenditure and provision.  The 
most significant feature of this change has been the decline in 
expenditure  by local authorities  on public transport relative to 
roads.  Thus, between 1984/85 and 1987/88 total local authority 
expenditure (revenue and capital) on public transport declined 
by  some 63% in real terms while  that on roads increased by 
0.6%.~'  This pattern of change can be seen as consistent with 
the  ideological  commitments  and  interests  promoted  by  the 
Government. 
Thus, attempts to restrict the level of spending are consistent 
with the Government's broader programme to reduce the role and 
scope  of the  public sector and to promote private sector capital 
accumulation.  This programme can be seen as having a basis in 
ideological commitments to the role of the market in promoting 
material growth reinforced by  the 'New Right' critique of the 
public sector, but also as reflecting the interests of private 
capital  promoted  by  the  present  Government.  Attempts  to 
influence  the  composition  of local  authority spending,  manifested 
in the decline in expenditure on public transport, can be seen  - 
2  8 as reflecting  moves  to direct  the  reduced  level  of  public 
expenditure increasingly to provide support to private sector 
capital accumulation at the expense of programmes directed to 
achieve social and environmental objectives.  Thus, the role of 
roads  in  supporting "economic growth  is  emphasised  by  the 
Government in its encouragement of local authority expenditure 
in this area while authorities' low fares policies justified by 
social and environmental conserations  were specifically  attacked 
by  the Government during the early to mid-1980s when  it was 
attempting to discourage local authority expenditure in that 
area.  The deregulation of public transport reflects, again, the 
commitment to the market  and  to providing the conditions to 
promote the profitability of the private sector. 
6.3  The TSG system and the Extension of Central Control 
As  we  have  seen,  an  important  measure  introduced  by  the 
Government as part of the broader programme of extended central 
control  was the reform of the  TSG system in 1985/86 which changed 
this grant from a block, unhpothecated support for integrated 
local transport programmes (including  public transport,  traffic 
management, road building and maintenance) to specific support 
for roads which play a significant non-local role (as  discussed 
previously).  In its original form, therefore, TSG under-pinned 
local authorities' autonomy and discretion in formulating co- 
ordinated plans to meet the perceived  transport problems and 
needs of local communities;  in its new form,  TSG is designed to 
persuade  local  authorities to construct roads which  are not 
primarily designed to  meet the needs of local communities.  This 
radical  difference  in scope  and purpose reflects  the  Government's 
broader objective of circumscribing more tightly the scope for 
the exercise  of  political  choice at  local  level  to produce 
transport policies and programmes which are at odds with the 
Government's own policies and priorities.  The deregulation of 
local  bus services,  the  cessation  of government  support  for local 
car parking provision and the general restrictions on capital 
allocations  available for  non-TSG programmes have served further 
to erode the scope for local authorities to develop co-ordinated 
and integrated  transport  plans to  meet the perceived needs  of  the 
communities  they  repre~ent.~~  Indeed,  the  very  notion  of 
'planning for need'  is being  undermined by  the government's 
commitment to making  local  transport  provision  increasingly 
subject to market forces. 
Under the present regime of Government controls, then, local 
authorities have  an  incentive to develop programmes of  road 
schemes  which will attract TSG support,  and there is evidence to 
indicate  that  authorities'  decision making  is  indeed  being 
influenced in line  with the Government s objectives  ."  There are 
two possible reasons for this.  The first is financial:  TSG 
substitutes for borrowing  and  therefore reduces debt charges 
which can be perceived as significant in a context of restraint 
on revenue expenditure.  Second, there is evidence to suggest 
that, in general, highways committees of local authorities tend 
to have some difficulty arguing for capital resources relative 
to the demands from such services as education, housing  and  -  - 81  social  services.  Therefore,  in  order  to  ensure-  -the 
continuation  of a roads  programme the highways committee and the 
professional  engineers of  an authority have  an  incentive to 
develop TSG eligible schemes as the only guarantee of capital 
allocation.  This has been recognised by the DTp: 
"There  are strong indications  that  TSG helps to  boost local 
authorities1  overall  capital  expenditure  on  roads. 
Authorities1  highway  engineers  certainly  see  TSG  as 
important  in  providing  guaranteed  resources  for  their 
programmes...  Increasingly it is  being seen as  the easiest 
and  sometimes  the  only  passport  to  roads  capital 
allocations:  evidence  is  beginning  to  emerge  that 
authorities  are in consequence  directingtheir  bids towards 
the expenditure most likely to receive TSG support.'*82 
It is possible to discern in this trend something of a shift in 
the  balance  of  influence  on  roads  decision making  in  local 
authorities between politicians and professionals.  The annual 
budgetary  process  in  local  authorities  resolves  issues  of 
resource  allocation  between  services  and,  notwithstanding 
developments  in  'corporate planning'  in  recent  years,  this 
process remains essentially 'political' in nature.  Thus, even 
given comprehensive information about the contribution of all 
service  programmes to the  authority's objectives  and the  relative 
lvalue',  in these terms, of proposed new programmes (and many 
authorities do not yet achieve this), decisions about priorities 
remain a matter for elected members and will be conditioned by 
values, ideological commitments and  the  influence of various 
local interests brought to bear upon the authority. 
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As indicated above, there is evidence that, in this political 
process  of  priority-setting,  roads  expenditure  tends  to  be 
subordinatedtothe  demands  of such  services  as education,  social 
services,  housing,  economic  development  and leisure  and community 
services.  This  is  reflected  both  in  the  distribution  of 
available capital allocation between services and in t$e  use of 
capital receipts which are available to the authority.  We saw 
earlier that prior to the abolition of the GLC and MCC s and the 
reform of the TSG  system, the political priorities of these 
authorities resulted  in a greater emphasis on expenditure on 
public transport support than on roads.  The availability of TSG 
with guaranteed capital allocation counter-acts this pattern of  1 
political priorities and  gives the highways professionals in 
local  authorities  a  'vested  interest'  in  promoting  the 
development of TSG -eligible schemes as the best  (or, indeed, 
only)  means of preservingthe  capital  programme  which  constitutes 
their basic 'raison d'etre'. 
Therefore, it is possible to see a weakening of local political 
influences on decision  making on local roads  due to the  operation 
of the current TSG system.  This is recognised in the recent DTp 
study which found that "...some  members are said to welcome TSG 
precisel?  because it  helps to  take  awkward decisions  out of their 
hands."8  Decision making on TSG-eligible schemes becomes an 
increasingly  'technical1 exercise  from the  local authorityls 
- 
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of preparing and submitting  applications to the DTp and awaiting 
its decision.  In this process the highways professionals play 
an enhanced role.  This  contrasts  with the  non TSG element of the 
road programme where authorities have to make decisions on the 
resources (capital  allocation and receipts) to  be made available 
in the light of competing needs in other service areas and it 
would  seem  that such decisions are primarily  'politicalv in 
nature. 
In relation  to  TSG  -  eligible  road  schemes,  therefore,  an 
important question  is how  the  DTp  makes  decisions on which 
schemes should receive grant support.  For all major schemes 
costing £1 million or more local authorities have to submit to 
the  DTp detailed  information including an assessment of  the 
estimated  benefits  of  the  schemes  (the  so-called  "Annex  B 
submission1'). An estimate  of economic  benefits must be provided, 
in accordance with procedures set out in the DTpls  COBA User 
~anual,'~  together with  an assessment of the impacts on road 
safety, the environment, the local community and local industry 
and commerce.  The DTp indicate~that  the latter impacts should 
be  quantified  where  possible.  The  Annex  B  submission  is 
designed to indicate  the extent to which a schemes  satisfies the 
criteria for  TSG support and to  permit an  assessment of its  value 
for  money and relative  merit compared to other schemes  competing 
for the cash-limit sum available for TSG. 
The  Annex B submission  provides a technical/analytical basis for 
decision making by  the DTp and  it is clear that it plays an 
important gole in decision on which  schemes should be grant- 
supported.  This implies that highways professionals also play 
an important role.  Thus,  there is extensive liaison between the 
professionals in local authorities and their respective  Regional 
Offices of the DTp over the preparation of Annex B submissions 
and  over  authorities1 progress with  their  roads programmes. 
Following the submission of TPPs by  authorities, professionals 
in  the  Regional  Offices  assess  the  submissions  and  make 
recommendations  on individual candidate schemes for grant to DTp 
headquarters.  Value for money will be an important factor but 
so also will be other factors relating to a knowledge of the 
state of  the  road  programme  in  individual authorities  (e.g. 
ability to start and progress a scheme).  The 'settlement co- 
ordinator'  at  DTp  headquarters  considers  all  regional 
recommendations and draws up a 'draft  settlementv  for comment by 
senior management  in the regions and  at headquarters before 
presentation to Ministers for their decision. 
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It  is difficult  to obtain evidence on the relative importance of 
Itechnicalv and  'political1 considerations in  this decision 
making process.  The  recent  efficiency scrutiny of the  TSG system 
limited comment on the  political dimension of the  process to  the 
following statement: 
vlBecause  both  central and  local government are affected 
there is always a political element to the TSG settlement, 
and so Ministers are bound to be closely involved1'.  90 
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3 1 Presumably,  this  political  element  will  relate  to  some 
consideration of the balance  of  resource  allocation between 
regiions  and  between  local  authorities  within  regions  in 
accordance  with  prevailing  concerns  within  the  Government. 
Nevertheless,  it  would  appear  that  the  technical/analytical 
dimension of the  process is  of considerable importance  reflected 
in the role played by professional recommendations. 
6.4  The Influence of Scheme A~~raisal  Technicrues 
Therefore, the process of developing local authority programmes 
of  TSG  -  eligible  major  road  schemes appears  increasingly 
'technical1  in nature  with an important  role  played by assessment 
procedures  and  professionals,  and  with  local  authorities 
exercising  political  discretion.  The  main  opportunity  for 
influence of local political considerations is in the initital 
perception of a problem or a need for a new road where elected 
members may respond to local interests and press for a scheme to 
be  developed  for  inclusion  in  the  authority's  plans  and 
programmes.  Nevertheless, the DTp's  requirement for Annex  B 
assessments  means that only schemes  which can  be justified  on  the 
necessary technical grounds will succeed in attracting TSG and 
the capital allocation cover required for it to be included in 
an authority's road programme.  Under the Government's capital 
expenditure  controls  authorities  would  have  considerable 
difficulties including major schemes in their roads plans and 
programmes which were not strong candidates for TSG support 
In  this  situation  authorities  have an incentive  to  strengthen  the 
technical basis of their road planning process and, indeed,  many 
authorities undertake or commission transportation studiesf  to 
this  end.  Such  studies,  frequently undertaken by  external 
consultants  employing  highlytechnical  procedures of  analysis  and 
evaluation,  serve  to  erode  further  the  role  of  political 
influences in the generation of road schemes, and to strengthen 
the role of professionals in the road planning process. 
Indeed, local authorities are being  encouraged by  the DTp to 
adopt  more 'rationalf  approaches  to scheme  appraisal in order to 
promote better value for money for resources allocated to road 
construction  and improvement.  We have seen  that,  in applications 
for  TSG,  authorities  are  asked  for  a  rigorous  economic 
assessment, "quantif  ied where possible" .  92  Moreover, the DTp is 
concerned also to improve the approach to appraisal of smaller 
road schemes in order togermit  capital allocations  to  be set  Inin 
a more  objective wayf'.  This more  thorough  application of 
rational appraisal procedures is seen as desirable to "highlighz 
the  effects  of  decisions  taken  for  non-economic  reasons1'. 
There is concern that in many local authorities "the priorities 
for  roads  ex enditure  are  evidently  decided  by  political 
imperatives" ;  9P  therefore  "a  clearly  understood  assessment 
technique should help to make these sorts  of political decisions 
more obvious and hence less easy for an authority to carry out 
without clear  justification^^ . 
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1 At the present time local authorities employ a wide range of 
procedures for  the appraisal of road schemes  and for determining 
priorities in their roads capital programmes.  A recent study of 
the use of priorities assessment techniques  (PATs) in British 
local authorities found that "a distinct lack of uniformity and 
standardisation  exists  between local  authorities  in  their  methods 
and procedures  for priority  assessmentfg  of highway schemes.  97 
Many have developed their own methods to suit their particular 
circumstances and  requirements.  Most  use  a  points  scoring 
approach in comparing  problems or schemes in terms of a range of 
impacts  on  traffic,  accidents, the  environment  and  broader 
planning  and  development policies.  Some authorities use the 
Leitch Framework and/or COBA instead of,  or in addition to,  their 
own PATs.  Considerable  variation  exists in the  way in which PATs 
are used in the road planning process from a focus on problem 
analysis  through  broad  scheme  'siftingg to  detailed  scheme 
evaluation and prioritisation.  Moreover, it was found that Iga 
number of authorites actually have no formal &AT,  relying on 
officersg  judgement and the political processrg. 
The above study concluded that some degree of standardisation in 
terms of "desirable and broadly compatible 10~ical~~ro~erties~~~~ 
is desirable  and this  view is supported by the  DTp.  The  recent 
efficiency scrutiny of local roads expenditure recommended that 
the  DTp should require  authoritiesto  use the Framework  approach, 
as used in trunk road assessment (and discussed in the previous 
section), for  major local road schemes submitted for TSG support 
incorporating a  COBA  or equivalent economic  assessment.  As 
regards smaller schemes, whether TSG-eligible or not, it was 
argued  that  a  standard  approach  was  desirable  for  the 
presentation of appraisal information by  local authorities in 
their TPPS "along the lines of a simplified frameworkvn. 
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Therefore, it would appear that the trend is towards increased 
standardisation of road scheme appraisal around the Framework 
approach in order  to  promote a more rational and formal  procedure 
in which, moreover,  economic  assessment  is  clearly  seen  as 
playing a predominant role in the determination of  'value for 
moneyg,  the major  stated concern of the DTp and Treasury in 
resource allocation  decisions.  This trend can be seen  as  having 
certain important implications.  Thus, the logic of assessment 
is increasingly  one in  which non-economic impacts of  road schemes 
are traded-off against economic benefits in order to obtain a 
measure  of  the  opportunity  cost of  decisions not  to choose 
schemes with the highest quantitative economic benefits.  This 
produces an inherent pressure to quantify and, indeed, derive 
monetary valuations, of such non-economic effects in order to 
increase  the  precision and rationality ofthe  assessment  process. 
Decision making  becomes  increasingly reduced  to a  matter  of 
calculation on the basis of market exchange values in line with 
the  dominant ideological commitment  to  market exchange processes 
in the promotion of material economic growth.  Maximisation of 
'value  for  moneyg  becomes synonymous  with support  forthe  process 
of private capital accumulation. 
A second important aspect  of this  trend concerns  the  implications 
-  - 
33 for local political control and discretion in decision makhq  on 
roads.  The increasing emphasis on the need to provide enhanced 
and standardisedtechnical  justifications  of  all road schemes  put 
forward in TPPs in application for TSG or capital allocation 
support,  indicates  a  growing  tendency  for  the  resources 
sanctioned by central government for use by local authorities  to 
be effectively hypothecated to specific schemes the decision on 
which  lies with the DTp.  The more that capital expenditure 
approval  by  central  government becomes  contingent  upon  DTp 
approval of specific scheme assessments, and the more that the 
DTpmonitorsthe  performance  of authorities' implemented  schemes, 
then the less will be the role of local political choice in the 
development of local authorities1  road programmes. 
Thus, the ability of authorities to choose schemes on the basis 
of local political priorities will be effectively reduced.  The 
notion  that  a  more  rigorous  assessment  should  permit  the 
opportunity cost of 'political considerations' to be identified 
is consistent  with the  preservation of local political choice  if 
full control over decisions remains at the local level.  Local 
councils  are  then accountable  totheir  electorates  for  thetrade- 
offs made;  for example, economic benefits foregone to secure 
environmental benefits.  However, in a situation where the DTp 
decides which schemes should be approved for grant or capital 
allocation, and where there is competition between authorities  l 
for scarce capital spending cover, those schemes which forego 
economic benefits to achieve other objectives are less likelyto 
gain DTp approval, given the Government's stated priorities for 
roads investment.  In  effect,  local authorities  could  be deterred 
from developing and including in their programmes schemes  which 
they believe will not receive high priority from the DTp;  in 
order to maximise their  prospects of capital spending cover they 
are more likely to conform to the DTpts  wish to see schemes  with 
high economic benefits. 
Much will depend on the extent to which  the DTp extends the 
approach currently applied to major TSG schemes to smaller and 
to  non-TSG  schemes  i.e.  the  extent  to  which  there  is  an 
increasing degree of effective  hypothecation of capital spending 
cover to specific schemes.  In this event, not only will there 
be an increase in central government control over roads decision 
making, but also an increase in the influence of professionals 
which,  as  described  above, has  occured  in  relation  to TSG 
schemes.  Thus, the role of professionals will be enhanced with 
the requirement for  more formal appraisal of smaller schemes  and 
authorities  are likely to  experience  pressure fromtheir  highways 
professionals to give greater priority to schemes with larger 
economic benefits in order to maximise the  prospects for capital 
spending cover to preserve the roads capital programme which 
constitutes their professional raison dtetre.  The role of DTp 
professionals will also be enhanced through increased liaison 
with their local authority counterparts  over scheme  appraisal  and 
progress  with  road  programmes.  In this  situation, elected 
members are likely effectively to delegate decision making on 
local  roads  to  the  professionals  as  a  largely  'technical1 
exercise  conditionedby  criteria laid down  by central  government.  - 
34 The effect of such a development would be to reduce further the 
scope of local autonomy and discretion and the extent to which 
local authorities are accountable  to  their local electorates for 
the use of public resources rather than to central government. 
This is  consistent  with the  Government's broader  programme  which, 
we have seen, involves  making local authorities  more accountable 
to central government in  the  use of reources in order to achieve 
greater central control over both the level and composition of 
local  authorities1 expenditure.  The  trend  discussed  above 
further  enhances  the  ability  of  the  Government  to  promote 
spending  on local roads in line with its main priorities viz. to 
provide benefits to  business traffic thus  supporting the  process 
of private capital accumulation. 
6.5  The ScoDe and Influence of Local Autonomv 
Therefore, we can see that the trend is for central government 
to achieve increasing influence  and control over the  development 
of local authorities1  road policies and programmes - over the 
level of decision making which is crucial to the determination 
of the scale  of resources used and the broad distribution of the 
benefits  of  those  resources  between  different  groups  and 
interests.  Within these  parameters more specific  distributional 
issues are raised during the  planning of local road schemes  which 
must  be  resolved in the decision-making process.  These are 
considered through  the  process of scheme  generation  and appraisal 
by local authorities.  The corollary of the  trend towards  reduced 
local  political  choice  at  the  level  of  roads  policies  and 
programmes is that such local discretion becomes relatively more 
focused on the issue of the distribution of specific gains and 
losses between local groups due to alternative scheme designs 
However, even at this  level local choice in relation to  major  TSG 
schemes  is  influenced  by  the  DTpls emphasis  on  quantified 
economic benefits which can lead to pressure on decision making 
in  local  authorities  to  select  scheme  options  with  greater 
economic benefits in order  to  enhance the  prospects of attracting 
TSG.  Moves  towards more  formal  appraisal  requirements  for 
smaller  non-TSG  schemes as  a  basis  for  sanctioning  capital 
spending cover, as discussed above,  are  likely to extend the 
scope of this influence.  The implication would be a tendency 
for the benefits to road users  in  terms of  time savings and 
reduced vehicle operating costs to be given greater weight in 
decision making  than the adverse  impact  of  schemes on  local 
communities in terms of, for example, noise, visual intrusion, 
disruption to present activities, loss of environmental amenity 
etc. 
Nevertheless, although the trend is towards increasing central 
government influence, towards  a 'narrowing1  of the  parameters of 
the  'control framework' within which local authority decision 
making on roads takes place, there remains an important degree 
of autonomy and discretion for authorities  in decisions  on scheme 
options.  Central government's 'control  framework'  provides a set  -  - 
35 of  guidelines, incentives and  sanctions which  influence -but 
cannot determine behaviour; the degree of conformity will vary 
between local  authorities  within certain  parameters.  This  degree 
of  autonomy  for  local  authorities  is  reflected  in  two 
characteristics  of the local roads planning process in terms of 
which it differs from the  process for  major trunk  roads  discussed 
in the previous section. 
The first characteristic is the lack of a standard procedure for 
the appraisal of local road schemes as indicated above in the 
discussion of PATS.  Whereas, as we have  seen, the DTp has 
standardised the  approach to  trunk road appraisal around the  use 
of the Framework,  based on COBA, local authorities employ a wide 
variety of approaches gfging variable (and usually less) weight 
to economic evaluation.  One possible reason for this is the 
limits to the applicability  of COBA  in urban contexts where 
national traffic growth ;"o~d  fixed trip matrix assumptions are 
likely to be unrealistic.  However, perhaps the  primary reason 
is the  fact  that  the main  period  of  development  of  formal 
techniques  oftransport  analysis and appraisal occured when local 
authorities had a high degree of autonomy with no pressure from 
central government  for standardisation.  Indeed, one of  the 
traditional benefits of strong, autonomous local government is 
seen  as  the  diversity  of  approaches  to  policy  making  and 
management  which  develops and  which  promotes  innovation and 
learning.  104 
Thus, the original TPP/TSG  system was  introduced  in  1975 to 
promote  the  concept  emobided  in  the  1968  Transport  Act  of 
comprehensive and  integrated transport planning to meet local 
needs.  As  a  block,  Iunhypothecated'  grant  it  served  to 
strengthen  local  authorities1  autonomy  by providing  resourcl$!!  for 
them to use at their own discretion to meet local needs.  In 
this context techniques for integrated transport planning were 
applied by authorities  according to their  own perceptions of need 
which encouraged a diversity of approaches.  Tv$.this diversity 
is now perceived as problematical by  the DTp  can be seen as 
reflecting the  change in thinking by central  government in  recent 
years about  the scope  of local authority autonomy embodied in  the 
reform of the TSG system and the extensions of central control 
and influence which we have identified. 
A further significant feature of decision making on local road 
schemes arising  from this tradition of relative autonomy for 
local  authorities  is  the  role  played by local  elected politicians 
which, as discussed above, is also the subject of DTp concern. 
Indeed,  our arguments above imply a direct relationship between 
the uneven development of formal appraisal techniques and the 
influence of local political considerations in roads decision 
making.  Increased standardisation of techniques as a basis for 
central government approval of capital spending power would, we 
have argued, tend to erode the scope of local political choice. 
Such choice is exercised by elected members of local authorities 
via whom local political considerations are brought to  bear upon 
the roads planning process.  There is significantly more scope 
for such considerations to influence decision making on local  - 
36 roads than on national, trunk, roads.  Thus, SACTRA indikated 
that 'l.. .we have been  informed by  local authorities that the 
involvement of their elected members at all stages enables local 
opinion  to  be  better  reflected  in  the  schemes  which  are 
considered. 
'Local opinion'  is brought to bear upon local roads decision 
making via elected members (in terms of the 'constituency' they 
represent) and via 'pressure  groups' who may be consulted or who 
may have to  lobby the  authority or individual  members on specific 
issues.  Authorities may also undertake public opinion surveys 
to  obtain  broader-based views.  Local  groups  have the  opportunity 
to give their views on authorities' statutory development plans 
.and TPPs and for individual road schemes there are  consultation 
'exercises and, commonly,  public inquiries.  Much depends on the 
receptiveness  of elected mbmers to the views expressed and this 
in turn  will depend both on the  extent to  which the substance and 
promoters of views 'key in' with the majority political make-up 
of the authority and on the channels  used to express views (e.g. 
whether groups  have  direct  access  to certain  members or  must make 
their  views  known  via  officials).  Thus,  influences  are 
'processed' and interpreted by members through a framework of 
political  beliefs  deriving  from  party-based  values  and 
ideological commitments and by officials through a framework of 
professional values and commitments.  1 
The above influences are embedded in the on-going operation of 
local political processes and  are not necessarily visible to 
empirical analysis of decision-making processes.  The exercise 
of power at such levels  may be of more importance in determining 
decisions  and outcomes  than  the  more formal  and visible  exercises 
at public consultation and participation which are undertaken by 
local authorities in the roads planning process.  Nevertheless, 
such exercises are more extensive than those undertaken in the 
planning of national roads and, in formal terms, provide more 
opportunity  for  local  people  to  influence  decision  making. 
However, there are two factors  which can be seen as limiting the 
significance and importance of such consultation exercises. 
The first is the theme of the dominant ideology identified in 
section  four  above  assigning authorityto  elected representatives 
in decision making, the corollary of which is limited popular 
experience  of  participatory  modes  of  decision  making  -  the 
decision-making culture  does  not encourage direct  participation. 
Consequently, formal participation and  consultation exercises 
tend not to attract a large popular response and those who do 
respond tend to be the most educated and articulate groups in 
society.  Io8  Moreover,  the  response  in  relation  to broader, 
strategic policy issues tends to be less than that on specific 
matters identifiable by people as having concrete implications 
for their lives.  Therefore, the scope of participation is, in 
effect,  limited and focussed  more on specific issues  of  who gains 
and who loses  due to  the implementation  of road schemes.  Broader 
policy issues are subjected to less effective scrutiny and are 
correspondingly resolvedmore  in terms  ofthe  less  visible levels 
of the exercise  of power  indicated above.  In this way  the  - 
3  7 ideological theme of the authority of representative democracy 
can  be seen as serving  to  reduce effective criticism  and scrutiny 
of the forms in which power is exercise in roads decision making 
thus  legitimisingthe  existing structure  of such  political  power. 
The  second  factor  is  the  role  of  professionals  in  formal 
exercises of participation  and consultation.  Thus, in exercises 
such as sample surveys  of local opinion, and public consultation 
exercises  in  relation  to  statutory  development  plans  and 
alternative routes for specific road schemes, local authority 
officials play an important role in terms of the design of the 
form and scope of consultation, the interpretation of views and 
opinions received, and the recommendation to members of action 
which should be taken in response to the views expressed.  In 
this  way  the  influence  of  local  groups  and  interests  is 
'filtered1 through  a  framework  of  professional  perceptions, 
assumptions and values - through a  Iparadiqm1  which expresses 
professional commitments  and conditions  professional  judgements. 
This 'processing1  of local opinion can  be seen as  serving further 
to protect from radical challenge existing structures of power 
and the outcomes which they produce. 
This analysis raises a question over the potential contribution 
to 'rational1  decision making of procedures of scheme appraisal 
which are used in the context of public consultation exercises  1 
to provide a basis for resolving disputes over the distribution 
of gains and  losses due to scheme impacts.  Our analysis has 
attempted to set such procedures in the context of the broader 
decision  making process and has emphasisedthe  relatively  limited  I 
role of this dimension of decision  making when viewed in a wider 
perspective.  As regards the specific issue of the role and 
contribution of the  Framework  approach, the fundamental  question 
which arises is to  what extent it represents  a useful procedural  l 
means  to increased rationality  in  decision making  or more a 
technical  facade  to  legitimise  the  existing  structure  of 
influence of dominant interests in decision making. 7.  Conclusion:  On the ScoDe for 'Rational' Decision Makinq 
In  many respects decision making in the transport sector can be 
characterised  as  highly  'rational'  and  'technocratic'.  In 
particular,  the  process  followed  in  planning  new  roads  at 
national  and  local  levels  conforms  in  general  to the  form 
prescribed  by  the  rational  model  starting  with  the problem 
definition, moving  through the development and evaluation of 
options to the selection and  implementation of the preferred 
scheme.  Analytical techniques are extensively used in traffic 
analysis  and  forecasting  and  in  scheme  appraisal. 
Correspondingly,  professionals and experts  play an important  role 
in various stages of the decision making process. 
However, our analysis suggests that such a technocratic view 
rests on a narrow and partial interpretation  of decision making. 
thus, such an interpretation focuses on the process of planning 
specific road schemes, taking as given the broader context of 
objectives and policy formulation and resource allocation which 
provides the parameters for  decision  making on specific schemes. 
We have  seen that decision making  at this broader  level  is 
dominated by ideological and political influences  which serve  to 
condition  the  process of planning individual schemes.  Moreover, 
even  at  this  latter  level  the  rationalist  ideal  of 
comprehensiveness is never feasible;  selectivity requires the 
exercise of judgement and judgement brings with it ideological 
and political influences.  This is perhaps most apparent in the 
definition of a transport 'problem*  and the perception of new 
road construction as the required solution. 
The technocratic interpretation can also be seen as engendered 
by  an  empiricist  approach  which  generalises  from  readily- 
observable aspects of the decision making process.  Such an 
approach will tend to over-emphasise the role of technical and 
anlytical components  of the process, commonly well-documented by 
professionals,  and  focus  on  case  studies  of  specific  road 
schemes,  to  the  relative  neglect  of  broader  political  and 
institutional aspects.  Moreover, analysis of the latter will 
tend  to focus on more  observable  'overt'  influences to the 
relative neglect of  'covert'  and  'latent' dimensions to the 
exercise  of  political  power.  The  influence  of  ideological 
commitments and of  'insider' interest groups are likely to be 
particularly under-stated in such an approach. 
Our  analysis  suggests  that  these  ideological  and  political 
influences are  of  considerable importance  in  roads decision 
making in two main respects.  The first is in the establishment 
of  central  government  objectives,  policies  and  resource 
allocations for roads  which are fundamental  to  the determination 
of the scale for provision of roads.  Moreover, in the process 
of planning national roads, these governmental commitments are 
not  open  to  scrutiny  and  challenge  in  the  development  of 
individual schemes on the grounds that they are products of the 
'democratic  decision of Parliament'.  We have seen that this, in 
-.  - 
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decision making process. 
Ideological and political influences can also  be seen as playing 
an important role in the development of the 'control framework' 
through  which central  government  attempts  to  ensure  that  decision 
making by local authorities  produces outcomes  consistent  with  the 
government's  own  objectives, policies  and  priorities.  This 
framework is defined primarily in terms of legislative measures 
and statutory instruments and it is clear that its development 
by  the  present  Government  over  the  past  decade  has  been 
influenced  primarily  by  ideological  commitments  and  the 
particular interest promoted by  the Government.  We have seen 
that this 'control framework' has a considerable influence on 
roads  decision  making  by  local  authorities,  an  influence, 
moreover, which is increasing. 
Therefore, in our view, road decision making should be seen a 
subject to a wide range of influences deriving from ideological 
commitments,  political pressure and technical  analysis. Attempts 
to characterise decision making  in  terms of  the theoretical 
models of  'rationalism' or 'incrementalism' do not seem to be 
particularly helpful.  Perspectives  on the  nature and balance of 
these influences will vary according to the level and scope of 
analysis - at the level of specific schemes or broader policies; 
of national or local government. 
Perspectives  on the role of techniques of analysis and appraisal 
will  vary, therefore, according  to how  the decision  making 
process is defined and conceptualised.  From our point of view, 
their role  in current roads decision making  can be  seen as 
serving two main purposes.  First, they provide a basis for 
resource  allocation  to roads  which is  more effective in  achieving 
the  Government's objectives  and priorities.  Second,  they  provide 
a basis for consideration of  the specific impacts of schemes on 
affected groups and interests  with a  view to deriving a route  and 
design which achieves a balance of gains and losses which can  be 
deemed  'appropriate', and which is capable of implementation. 
The overriding purpose  is the achievement of more  efficient 
implementation of road building as the means to ideologically - 
and politically - determined ends  which are given  to,  and beyond 
scrutiny in, the process of planning specific road schemes.  The 
role of 'technique' should therefore be seen in the context of 
ideological and political influences on objectives,  policies and 
the  framework  of  central  government  control  over  local 
authorities.  From this perspective, the technocratic view of 
rational decision making can be seen as serving to conceal the 
influence  of ideological  commitments,  values and interests  behind 
a 'rationalistic' facade;  as promoting acceptance of decisions 
conditioned by  these  influences by  focusing  on  the role  of 
'rational' techniques;  as serving the ideological purpose of 
legitimising the existing structure of power. 
Nevertheless, there is widespread  support for the view  that 
increased 'rationality' in decision making is desirable.  This 
would imply a greater role for 'rational' techniques of analysis 
-  - 
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This  view can  be seen as  resting on a set of assumptions embodied 
in  the  dominant  ideology.  In particular,  it  assumes  that 
decision  making is about the choice of the best means to achieve 
given ends and  that the process  of  choice will be the more 
rational for the application of scientifically-based analytical 
techniques.  Elected representatives will therefore be better 
informed  by the  analysis  undertaken by impartial experts and able 
to  make  more  rational  decisions  in  response  to  pressures 
exercised by  the plurality of groups in society based  on an 
assessment of the broad public interest. 
To the extent that these assumptions are not valid the scope for 
increased 'rationality1  in decision  making will be limited.  Our 
analysis has indicated the fundamental problems with this view. 
First,  the  consideration  of alternative  means cannot  be separated 
radically from the ends to which they relate;  decision making 
should not be seen purely as a technical exercise of planning 
road  schemes  but  rather  as  a  broader  process  conditioned 
throughout  by ideological  and political influences.  The  problems 
experienced during the 1970's with opposition and disruption of 
roads  public  inquiries  can  be  seen  as  a  result  of  the 
inappropriate application of this formal means-ends rationality 
in the decision making process.  Second, inequalities in power 
and influence between different groups and interests in society 
and  imperfections in  structures of  democratic accountability 
undermine  the  model  role  of  elected  representatives  and 
democratic institutions in the rationalist design. 
Based upon this analysis  we  would argue, then,  that the  political 
and institutional dimensions of the decision making process set 
the context for  'improvements' which  can be achieved  through 
development  in  analytical  techniques  and  procedures. 
Developments motivated by the ideals of the rational model are 
unlikely to secure practical benefits unless they are tailored 
carefully to 'mesh' with political and institutional  realities. 
This is certainly the lesson to be derived, for example, from 
attempts  to  introduce techniques  of  corporate planning  into 
central and local government over the past twenty years or so. 
The  wide variety of approaches developed by local authorities to 
analysis and appraisal in roads decision making suggests that 
their development has proceeded according to local perceptions 
of appropriateness in relation to  the  political and institutional 
context.  This  analysis  brings  into question the notion  of 
standardised techniques to  improve the  rationality of  local 
authority decision making on roads. 
We would conclude that moves towards such standardisation are 
best understood in the context of increasing central government 
control over local authorities - as part of a broader programme 
of  central  government which  is reducing  the  influence  over 
decision  making of local political considerations.  The logic of 
this  increased central control  can  be relatedtothe  governments' 
concern  to reduce the  role  of  the  state  in  the  allocation 
resources in line  with its commitments  to expanding the scope of 
the market and the private sector.  Where the state does retain 
-  - 
41 a residual role, there is then a need to ensure that decisions 
are as consistent  as  possible with the  market philosophy and this 
is  achieved  through  controls  which  relate  decisions  to 
governmental objectives.  We have seen that these objectives 
embody  'markett concerns of efficiency and  the promotion of 
economic urowth.  In this wav.  the uovernment can be seen as 
seeking to  impose a 'pseudo-m&ket8  ffamework on state decision 
making.  Increased control over local authority decision making 
is crucial to this  project in order to overcome a long tradition 
of planning  services to meet  local need  based  on collective 
provision to meet social objectives.  In this scheme of things 
increased standardisation  of techniques and procedures to 'aid' 
decision making relates to increased central government control 
over the resources available  to authorities for the  provision of 
services and facilities which, in turn, implies a reduction in 
local political autonomy and control. 
Thus, we have seen that, since the reform of the TSG system in 
1985/86, the  Government  has gained greater  effective  control  over 
local authorities roads decision making such that the size of 
authorities' roads  programmes is now primarily determined by DTp 
decisions  on  TSG and capital spending cover.  This increased role 
for  central  government  has been reflected in  moves to  develop and 
standardise appraisal procedures around the Framework approach  I 
in order to provide the DTp with a better  indication of the  1 
extent  to  whcih road schemes  achieve  the  government's objectives. 
1 
Moves to develop standardised appraisal procedures for smaller 
non-TSG  schemes  indicate  an extension  of  central  government 
control over resource allocation to ensure greater conformity 
with the governments objectives, with a concomitant erosion of 
local political discretion. 
In the present political context, then, the focus, in terms of 
developing  technical  aspects  of  the  roads  decision-making  l 
process,  is on enhancing the capacity to determine value for 
money  in relation to the governments objectives.  This will 
increase the government's ability to ensure the allocation of 
state-controlled  resources  in  accordance  with the 'pseudo-market' 
framework to further its ideological and political programme. 
Given the commitment to the use of the Framework approach to 
scheme appraisal  there  is likely  to be  an  increasing trend 
towards quantification of all impacts in order to enable more 
'precise'  measures of  value for  money to be obtained.  This  would 
promote  the  incorporation,  in  particular,  of  environmental 
impacts of road  schemes into the calculus of market exchange 
values. 
This  trend  towards 'pseudo-market'  principles in  roads  investment 
appraisal is consistent with the governments measures to move 
responsibility  for  the  provision  of  transport  services and 
facilities from  state  institutions  into the  'market place'. 
Thus, the government has recently announced its intention to 
legislate to amend the 1980 Highways Act to allow the private 
sector to provide new roads financed by tolls.lo9 The government 
sees  the 'user  pays' principle as  l'..  .essential if we  are to  move 
the provision of roads nearer the market place.1t110  Since the 
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urban bus  services  (outside London)  have been  provided  on a 
commercial basis.  New criteria developed by the government for 
grant support  to  major local  public transport  investment  projects 
under Section 56 of the 1968 Transport Act require that such 
projects should  be financed as  much as  possible from user charges 
supplemented by private sector development gains.  Grant support 
will re+,yte only to external benefits, in particular congestion 
relief.  Consequently,  appraisal of such projects is  dominated 
by the determination  of value for  money in  purely financial terms 
and it is  clear  that  the  case for  grant support  will increasingly 
require external benefits to be quantified into market exchange 
values. 
This latter development has most relevance to the financing of 
urban light  rapid transit (LRT) systems  which are  currently  under 
investigation in many large urban areas.  112  The requirement for 
such schemes to finance user benefits from fares is consistent 
with the  Government's  move towards  privately-financedtoll  roads; 
however,  whereas  all  LRT  schemes  will  be  subject  to  this 
discipline, most road schemes will continue to be provided from 
public expenditure with the case for provision dominated by the 
calculation  of user benefits.  The tpseudo-market'  framework for 
roads  provides for  continuing substantial  public expenditure for 
new trunk road  construction, as indicated by the Governments 
plans to spend some 40% more on new construction over tpe next 
3  years (1991/92) than over the previous 3 year period. l3  The 
discrepancy  in  the  approach  to  financing  road  and  public 
transport  provision  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  the 
government's preceptions of the key role of roads in supporting 
economic growth - in underwriting the process of private capital 
accumulation;  the ideological commitment to individual freedom 
and choice;  and the influence of powerful interests  behind road 
construction. 
It  would appear, then, that roads provision is likely to remain 
primarily a public  sector responsibility for the foreseeable 
future,  notwithstanding  an  increasing  role  for  the  private 
sector.  Concern with value for money and opportunity costs is 
likely  to increase  in  a  context of  restrained total  public 
expenditure  and  continuing  erosion  of  the  scope  of  public 
provision as activities  are transferred into the  private sector. 
Therefore, there will probably be continuing pressure for roads 
appraisal techniques to provide improved measures of value for 
money  which  will  permit  the  government,  primarily  via  the 
Treasury, to pursue its interpretation of the most effective 
allocation  of resources. As argued above,  giventhe  government's 
objectives and priorities, the emphasis is likely to be placed 
increasingly on economic benefits and on the quantification of 
scheme  impacts  to  facilitate  their  Ivaluation'  within  the 
'pseudo-market' framework. 
However, there is an important second dimension to the role of 
roads  appraisal  procedures  which we  highlighted in our  discussion 
the Leitch Framework approach in Section 5  above.  This is  their 
role in identifying  the impact of schemes  on different  groups  and  - 
43 in providing a basis for consultation and discussion on scheme 
options to facilitate compromise and agreement.  This dimension 
is also likely to become increasingly important in the context 
of  an  expanded  road-building  programme  with  the  Government 
concerned to achieve rapid progress in implementation.  In  view 
of the  opposition and  consequent delays to public  inquiries 
engendered by the expanded road-building programme of the early 
19701s,  the  concerns  which  promoted  the  review  of  highway 
inquiries procedures and the review of appraisal techniques by 
the Leitch Committee once again become particularly apposite. 
To what  extent will  the  reforms implemented  following these 
reviews help to defuse potential opposition and  conflict and 
speed up the planning process?  To what extent will they enhance 
the legitimacy of the  process in the eyes of affected groups  and 
secure their consent in the outcomes? 
On the basis of our analysis  we conclude that these reforms have 
not addressed the fundamental issue of the influence of dominant 
ideological themes, values and interests on decision making and 
have  not  affected  the  broad  structure  of  a  process  which 
preserves central control over decision making and limits the 
scope for influence of alternative values and interests.  They 
concern primarily the approach to considering the specific local 
gains and losses due to alternative route  alignments,  with issues 
of Government  objectives,  policies and priorities being given to 
these considerations  and beyond effective critical scrutiny.  We 
concluded that opposition to road schemes will be difficult to 
defuse in the discussion of specific scheme impacts if  such 
opposition is generated to any significant degree by conflicts 
of  basic values and, in particular, by conflict  with the  dominant 
values expressed in Government objectives and policy which are 
given to such discussion. 
Looking  specifically at the Framework approach, if it is to 
achieve  the  objectives  set out for it by the Leitch Committee  two 
conditions would  appear to be  required:  first, consent by 
affected groups in the objectives and policies which underpin 
proposals for specific road schemes;  and, second, a willingness 
by  all  groups  concerned  to  compxomise  and  agree  on  the 
distribution of  gains and  losses due to scheme impacts.  As 
regards the first condition, consent may  derive either  from 
agreement with such objectives and policies, or, in the case of 
disagreement,  from a perception ofthe  legitimacy of the  process 
by which they are produced.  A potential problem here, which we 
have  discussed,  is  the  limited  ability  of  Parliamentary 
institutions to hold  the Government accountable to interests 
other than those promoted by the Government itself.  This can 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of Government policy in the 
eyes of those who do not subscribe to the dominant ideology and 
whose opposition to road schemes derives, at least in part, from 
value considerations. 
Even if consent at the level of values and policy is forthcoming 
problems are likely to arise with  the second condition.  In 
highlightingthe  distribution  of  gains and losses  between various 
affected groups the Framework  approach can be seen as increasing  -  - the  potential for conflict and disagreements  whilst providing no 
new grounds for resolving them.  Thus, provision for financial 
compensation of losses is limited under the terms of the 1973 
Land Compensation Act to adverse impacts on land and property.  114 
Many adverse impacts of road schemes remain uncompensated and, 
indeed, some people experiencing them would argue that they are 
incapable  of  being  compensated  in  financial  terms.  The 
achievement of a consensus  on the  preferred form of a road scheme 
then  depends  on  the preparedness  of  those  experiencing  the 
adverse impacts to trade them off against the benefits of the 
scheme whatever the distribution of these might be. 
If the above conditions are not met then a consensus decision, 
acceptable to all affected groups, will not be possible and the 
decision  made by the  Secretary of State  will impose costs  on some 
groups who  bear  them  unwillingly.  The danger  is that the 
Framework approach merely serves to give the appearance that the 
interests of all affected groups are being taken into account  but 
has no real impact in terms of promoting consensual decision 
making.  In this sense it would provide a rational facade which 
serves to conceal and legitimise the real exercise of power.  It 
would appear that in order for the Framework approach to have a 
real impact on decision making certain important political and 
institutional reforms would be required. 
The fundamental point is that the  'philosophy' underlying the 
Framework  approach  does  not  match  with  the  political  and 
institutional context in which it is applied.  This 'philosophy' 
embodies  assumptions of  an  open  and  participatory  style  of 
decision making in which all groups are encouraged to take part 
and can have equal influence.  There is an implicit model of 
pluralist democracy promoting  'interactive participation' with 
people actively sharing in the policy-making process.  "5  We have 
seen,  however,  that  roads  decision  making  in  practice  is 
characterised by a  culture of limited participation,  underpinned 
by dominant ideological themes which emphasises the authority of 
elected representatives and the institutions of representative 
democracy, and  of  professionals and  experts with  command of 
'facts' and  'scientific' procedures.  It is also characterised 
by a high degree of control by state institutions and the elites 
which control  them and,  as  Boaden at a1 argue ".  .  .elite  attitudes 
tend to favour models of participation which strictly limit the 
role of the 
It is indeed a fatal contradiction in the Leitch Committee's 
arguments that they saw  the Framework approach as promoting both 
a  'managerial'  model  of  improved  central  control  and  a 
'partici atory' model of improved public involvement in  decision 
making.  We have discussed above the trend towards increasing 
emphasis on assessing the value for  money of road schemes  within 
a  'pseudo-market'  framework  which  is  consistent  with  the 
'managerial'  model.  However, for  the Framework approach to  play 
the role effectively which  is implied by  the  'participatory' 
model  would  require  some  radical  changes  in  ideological, 
political  and  institutional  terms  designed  to  open  up  the 
decision  making process to equal influence  of all individuals  and 
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process.  This would have major implications for the structure 
and exercise of power in  society and for its institutional  basis. 
It would  imply, in particular, a decentralisation of decision 
making more to the local level where community participation can 
best be promoted. 
In the present context in the absence of such reforms, the best 
prospects for  progress through the  use of the Framework approach 
in assessing the distribution of scheme impacts would appear to 
exist in local authorities  where decision making on road schemes 
is more open to local communities.  However, we have noted the 
recent trend towards increasing central government influence on 
authorities' decision making in relation to major road schemes 
through arrangements for sanctioning capital spending cover. 
Nevertheless, the  implementation  of a system for  decision support 
based on the Framework approach could provide a means to improve 
public participation in decisions on local road schemes, in the 
context of moves currently underway in many local authorities to 
open up decision making to the public  in the  'public service 
orientation.  "l8  There is some debate as to whether such moves 
are merely cosmetic or whether they represent an institutional 
change  which  wi&$  genuinely  improve  local  participation  in 
decision making.  To the extent that the latter is the case 
effective local participation in roads decision making could be 
improved from the earliest stages in which  local communities 
could play a more active role in defining the nature of local 
transport problems and of possible approaches to solving them. 
Systems for decision support which build  on and promote such 
institutional change  can serve  to  enhance participatory decision 
making.  However, in the absence of institutional reform there 
is real danger that such systems will merely give an appearance 
of enhanced participation whilst refining further the 
technocratic  facade  which  conceals  the  real  influences  on 
decision making  and  serves to legitimise the decision making 
process  permitting greater 'efficiency' in the implementation  of 
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